This crash and the Luna debacle are similar in that both occurred when major exchanges began accepting non-fiat stablecoins as high-LTV collateral, leading to the spread of risk across exchanges. One is UST, the other is USDe. The combination of "stability" and high collateralization ratios has misled most people. There are two common approaches to introducing non-fiat stablecoins as collateral: One is to allow high collateralization ratios (90%+), but set deposit/loan limits and a hard price anchor (such as 1, or the USDT/USDC price). This is a common practice in DeFi lending protocols. However, this approach can backfire. If UST de-pegs, the protocol will be held liable for all bad debts. The other is to use market prices (liquidity risk) as a price feed, but set lower collateralization ratios (50-70%) and treat it as a volatile asset. The worst combination is using market prices as a price feed while allowing high collateralization ratios. Furthermore, the lack of a fully open arbitrage environment on CEXs leads to low arbitrage efficiency, further amplifying the risk. LSD-like assets face the same problem. These assets are actually volatile assets disguised as "stability".