Regarding the Super Jun improvement proposals, here are a few personal opinions: From a risk management perspective, exchanges should discourage this type of circular lending arbitrage. There's currently no substantial arbitrage opportunity between the underlying yield of sUSDe and Treasury bonds. This type of arbitrage activity can easily amplify risk and be counterproductive. Furthermore, no asset should be guaranteed a floor price (0.85). A floor price guarantee is essentially a safety net, and there's no need to excessively assume third-party trust (not to mention the inherent competitor trust risk with USDe). Even if adding mint/burn within the platform or swapping through a custodian could address larger-scale liquidity decoupling, it wouldn't resolve the underlying liquidity bottleneck (and would also introduce additional mint permission risk). The core of this bottleneck lies in the USDe mechanism itself, which must implement a fixed redemption quota. This daily quota is almost 50 times the minting volume. In other words, manipulating the USDe exchange rate isn't a question of whether it can be done, but rather how much capital is required. USDe currently cannot withstand a liquidity shock of $1 billion. The larger issue is that USDe inherently carries counterparty risk from multiple exchanges. Adding circular leverage effectively means lending credit to your competing counterparties, leveraging counterparty risk. A more rational approach would be to integrate on-chain segregated pools and lending protocols within the platform, bringing lending and borrowing arbitrage directly to the chain. The platform would only provide liquidity venues and fiat currency access.