What changes have occurred in the value of money?
Article author and source: Horizon Global Strategy
Naturally, as a systematic global macro investor leaving 2025, I reflected on the mechanics of what happened, particularly in the markets. That's what today's reflection is about.
As a systemic global macro investor who exits the market in 2025, I naturally reflected on the mechanisms that led to this, particularly the market's performance. That's the subject of today's reflection.
Though the facts and returns are differently indisputable, I see things from most others. While most people see US stocks and particularly US AI stocks to be the best investments and hence the biggest investment story of 2025, it is indisputably true that the biggest returns (and hence the biggest story) came from 1) what happened to the value of money (most importantly the dollar, other fiat currencies, and gold) and 2) US stocks significantly underperforming both non-US stock markets and gold (which was the best performing major market) principally as a result of fiscal and monetary stimulations, productivity gains, and big shifts in asset allocations away from US markets. In these reflections, I step back and look at how this money/debt/market/economy dynamic worked last year, and I briefly touch on how the other four big forces—politics, geopolitics, acts of nature, and technology—affected the global macro picture in the context of the evolving Big Cycle.
While the facts and returns are undeniable, I disagree with most people. Although most believe that U.S. stocks, especially U.S. AI stocks, are the best investments and will therefore be the biggest investment story of 2025, one thing is beyond doubt:
The biggest returns (and therefore the biggest story) come from 1) changes in currency value (most importantly the US dollar, other fiat currencies, and gold) and 2) the significant underperformance of US stocks compared to non-US stocks and gold (gold being the best-performing major market), primarily due to fiscal and monetary stimulus, productivity gains, and a significant shift of asset allocation away from the US market.
In these reflections, I take a step back to examine how this monetary/debt/market/economic dynamic operated last year, and briefly touch upon how the other four major forces—politics, geopolitics, natural factors, and technology—influence the global macroeconomic landscape within the context of an evolving macro-cycle.
Regarding 1) what happened to the value of money: the dollar fell by 0.3% against the yen, 4% against the renminbi, 12% against the euro, 13% against the Swiss franc, and 39% against gold (which is the second largest reserve currency and the only major non-fiat currency). So, all fiat currencies fell, and the biggest story and the biggest market moves of the year were the result of the weakest fiat currencies falling the most, while the The strongest/hardest currencies strengthened the most. The best major investment of the year was long gold (returning 65% in dollar terms), which outperformed the S&P index (which returned 18% in dollars) by 47%. Or, said differently, the S&P fell by 28% in gold-money terms. Let's remember some key principles that pertain to what is happening:
Regarding the first point: what changes have occurred in the value of money?
The US dollar fell 0.3% against the Japanese yen, 4% against the Chinese yuan, 12% against the euro, 13% against the Swiss franc, and 39% against gold (gold is the second largest reserve currency and the only major non-statutory currency).
Therefore, all fiat currencies are weakening, and the biggest story and the biggest market volatility this year is caused by the weakest fiat currencies falling the most, while the strongest/hardest currencies are rising the most.
The best-performing major investment this year was long on gold (65% return in USD terms), outperforming the S&P 500 (18% return in USD terms) by 47%. In other words, the S&P 500 fell 28% when measured in gold.
Let us remember some key principles relevant to the current situation:
When one's own currency goes down, it makes it look like the things measured in it went up. In other words, looking at the investment returns through the lens of a weak currency makes them look stronger than they really are. In this case, the S&P returned 18% for a dollar-based investor, 17% for a yen-based investor, 13% for a renminbi-based investor, only 4% for a euro-based investor, only 3% for a Swiss franc-based investor, and, for a gold-based investor, it returned -28%.
When a country's currency depreciates, it makes things measured in that currency appear to have appreciated. In other words, looking at investment returns through the lens of a weak currency makes them appear stronger than they actually are.
In this example, S&P's returns were 18% for investors denominated in US dollars, 17% for investors denominated in Japanese yen, 13% for investors denominated in Chinese yuan, only 4% for investors denominated in euros, only 3% for investors denominated in Swiss francs, and -28% for investors denominated in gold.
What happens with the currency matters a lot to shifts in wealth and what happens economically. When one's currency goes down, it reduces one's wealth and one's buying power, it makes one's goods and services cheaper in others' currencies, and it makes others' goods and services more expensive in one's own currency. In these ways, it affects inflation rates and who buys what from whom, though it does so with a lag. Whether or not you are currency hedged matters a lot. What if you don't have, and don't want to take, a view on the currency? What should you do? You should always be hedged to your least-risk currency mix and make tactical moves from there if you think you are capable of making them well. I won't digress now into an explanation of how I do that, though I will later.
Currency changes have a significant impact on wealth transfer and economic conditions. When a currency depreciates, it reduces the wealth and purchasing power of its holders, making goods and services denominated in other currencies cheaper and vice versa. Through these mechanisms, currency changes affect inflation rates and who buys what from whom, although these effects are lagged.
Hedging currency risk is crucial. What if you neither have nor want to hold an opinion on a currency?
You should always hedge with your least risky currency pairing, and then make tactical adjustments based on that if you believe you are capable of doing it well. I won't go into detail about how I do this now, but I will later.
As for bonds—ie, debt assets—because they are promises to deliver money, when the value of money goes down, their real worth is lowered even as their nominal prices rise. Last year, 10-year US Treasury bonds returned 9% (roughly half from yield and half from price) in dollar terms, 9% in yen terms, 5% In renminbi terms, and -4% in euro terms, -4% in Swiss franc terms, and -34% in gold terms—and cash was an even worse investment. You can see why foreign investors didn't like dollar bonds and cash (unless they were currency hedged). Thus far, the bond supply/demand imbalance has not been a serious problem, but a large amount of debt (nearly $10tn) will need to be rolled going forward. At the same time, it appears likely the Fed will be inclined to ease to push real interest rates down. For these reasons, debt assets look unappealing, especially at the long end of the curve, and a further steepening of the yield curve seems probable, though it seems questionable to me that the Fed's easing will be as much as is discounted in the current pricing.
As for bonds—debt assets—because they represent a promise to pay money, their real value decreases even if nominal prices rise when the value of the currency declines. Last year, the 10-year U.S. Treasury yielded 9% in dollars (roughly half from yield and half from price); 9% in yen; 5% in yuan; -4% in euro; -4% in Swiss franc; -34% in gold; and cash fared even worse. You can understand why foreign investors dislike dollar bonds and cash (unless they have hedged their currencies).
So far, the supply-demand imbalance in bonds is not a serious problem, but a large amount of debt (nearly $10 trillion) will need to be rolled over in the future. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve appears likely to favor easing to keep real interest rates low.
For these reasons, debt assets appear unattractive, especially at the longer end of the term curve, and a further steepening of the yield curve seems likely, although I doubt that the Fed's easing measures may not be as large as currently priced in.
Regarding2) US stocks significantly underperforming non-US stocks and gold (which was the best performing major market), as previously mentioned, while US stocks were strong in dollar terms, they were much less strong in the currencies that were strong, and they significantly underperformed other countries' equities. Clearly, investors would have much rather been in non-US stocks than in US stocks, just as they would have preferred to be in non-US bonds than in US bonds and US cash. More specifically, European stocks outperformed US stocks by 23%, Chinese stocks outperformed by 21%, UK stocks outperformed by 19%, and Japanese stocks outperformed by 10%. Emerging market stocks as a whole did better, returning 34%, while emerging market dollar debt returned 14% and emerging market local currency debt in dollar terms returned 18% as a whole. In other words, there were big shifts in flows, values, and, in turn, wealth away from the US, and what is happening will probably lead to more rebalancing and diversifying.
Regarding the second point: US stocks significantly underperformed non-US stocks and gold.
As mentioned earlier, while US stocks have performed strongly when denominated in US dollars, they have not performed as well when denominated in stronger currencies and have significantly lagged behind stocks in other countries. Clearly, investors prefer holding non-US stocks to US stocks, just as they prefer holding non-US bonds to US bonds and US dollar cash.
More specifically, European stocks outperformed US stocks by 23%, Chinese stocks by 21%, British stocks by 19%, and Japanese stocks by 10%.
Overall, emerging market equities outperformed, with a return of 34%, while emerging market dollar bonds returned 14%, and emerging market local currency bonds denominated in US dollars returned 18% overall.
In other words, there has been a significant shift in capital flows, valuations, and the resulting wealth away from the United States, and all of this is likely to lead to further rebalancing and diversification.
As for US stocks last year, the strong results were due to both strong earnings growth and a P/E expansion. More specifically, earnings were up 12% in dollar terms, the P/E rose by about 5%, and the dividend yield was about 1%, so the total return of the S&P was about 18% in dollars. The “Magnificent 7” stocks in the S&P 500, which account for about a third of its market cap, had earnings growth of 22% in 2025, and, contrary to popular thinking, the other 493 stocks in the S&P also had strong earnings growth at 9%, so the whole S&P 500 index had earnings growth of 12%. That happened as a result of sales increasing by 7% and margins increasing by 5.3%, so sales were responsible for 57% of the earnings increase and margin improvements were responsible for 43% of it.* It appears that some significant portion of the margin improvements was due to technology efficiencies, but I can't see the numbers to tell for In any case the earnings improvements were largely due to the economic pie (ie, sales) increasing and companies (hence the capitalists who own them) capturing most the improvement and workers capturing relatively little of it. It will be very important to monitor the margin increases that go to profits going forward because the markets are now discounting that these increases will be large while leftist political forces are trying to capture a greater share of the pie.
As for US stocks last year, the strong performance was attributed to both earnings growth and the expansion of price-to-earnings ratios. More specifically, in dollar terms, earnings grew by 12%, the price-to-earnings ratio rose by about 5%, and the dividend yield was about 1%, resulting in a total dollar return of approximately 18% for the S&P 500.
The "Big Seven," which account for about one-third of the S&P 500's market capitalization, saw earnings growth of 22% in 2025. Contrary to popular belief, the remaining 493 stocks in the S&P 500 also experienced strong earnings growth of 9%, resulting in an overall earnings growth of 12% for the S&P 500. This was driven by a 7% increase in sales and a 5.3% improvement in profit margins; therefore, sales contributed approximately 57% to earnings growth, while improved profit margins contributed approximately 43%.
It appears that a significant portion of the improved profit margins is due to technological efficiency, but I cannot see specific data to confirm this. In any case, the improved profitability is largely due to the expansion of the economic pie (i.e., sales), with businesses (and therefore the capitalists who own them) reaping the lion's share of the improvement, while workers receive relatively less.
Looking ahead, we need to closely monitor the rise in profit margins flowing into profits, as the market is now assuming that these rises will be substantial, and left-wing political forces are trying to seize a larger share.
While it is easier to know the past than the future, we do know something about the present that can help us better anticipate the future if we understand the most important cause/effect relationships. For example, we know that with PE multiples high and credit spreads low, valuations appear to be stretched. If history is a guide, this portends low future equity returns. When I calculate expected returns based on where stock and bond yields are using normal productivity growth and the profits growth that results from it, my long-term equity expected return would be at about 4.7% (a sub-10th percentile reading), which is very low relative to existing bond returns at about 4.9%, so equity risk premiums are low. Also, credit spreads contracted to very low levels in 2025, which was a positive for lower credit and equity assets, but it leaves these spreads less likely to decline and more likely to rise, which is a negative for these assets. All this means that there isn't much more return that can be squeezed out of the equity risk premiums, credit spreads, and liquidity premiums.** It also means that if interest rates rise, which is possible as there are growing supply/demand driven pressures (ie, supply is increasing while the demand picture is worsening) to have happen because the value of money is declining, all else being equal, it will have a large negative effect on the credit and stock markets.
While understanding the past is easier than predicting the future, we can better predict the future from our understanding of the current situation if we understand the most important causal relationships.
For example, we know that when the price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) is high and credit spreads are low, valuations appear stretched. Historically, this suggests lower future stock returns. When I calculate expected returns based on the current levels of stock and bond yields, combined with normal productivity growth and the resulting profit growth, my expected long-term stock return is approximately 4.7% (below the 10th percentile), which is very low compared to the current bond return of approximately 4.9%, resulting in a low equity risk premium. Furthermore, credit spreads are expected to narrow to extremely low levels by 2025, which is a positive factor in reducing credit and equity asset risk, but also makes these spreads less likely to fall further and more likely to rise, which is detrimental to these assets.
All of this means that it is already difficult to extract more returns from equity risk premiums, credit spreads, and liquidity premiums. It also means that if interest rates rise—which is possible given the increasing supply-demand driven pressures (e.g., increased supply and a deteriorating demand outlook) as currency values decline—this would have a significant negative impact on credit and stock markets, all else being equal.
Of course, there are big questions about Fed policy and productivity growth ahead. It appears most likely that the newly appointed Fed chair and the FOMC will be biased to push nominal and real interest rates down, which would be supportive to prices and inflate bubbles. As for productivity growth, it will likely improve in 2026, though a) how much it will improve and b) how much of it will be allowed to flow through to benefit company profits, stock prices, and, in turn, capitalist owners versus how much will go to workers and socialists in the form of comp changes and taxes (which is the classic political right/left question) are uncertain.
Of course, there are significant questions about the future of Federal Reserve policy and productivity growth.
Currently, it appears likely that the new Federal Reserve Chairman and the Federal Open Market Committee will favor lowering both nominal and real interest rates, which would benefit prices and fuel asset bubbles. As for productivity growth, it is projected to improve in 2026, although a) the extent of the improvement, and b) how much of the gains will be allowed to flow to corporate profits, stock prices, and consequently capital owners, and how much will flow to workers and social arrangements in the form of wage changes and taxes (a classic political right/left issue) remains uncertain.
Consistent with how the machine works, in 2025 the Fed's cutting interest rates and easing the availability of credit lowered the discount rate, determining the present value of future cash flows and lowering risk premia, which together contributed to the previously described results. These changes supported the prices of assets that do well in reflations, especially those with long-durations, like equities and gold, so now these markets are no longer cheap. Also, notably, these reflationary moves didn't help venture capital, private equity, and real estate—ie, the illiquid markets—very much. Those markets are having problems. If one believes the stated valuations in VC and PE (which most people don't), liquidity premiums are now very low; I think it's obvious that they are likely to rise a lot as the debt these entities took on has to be financed at higher interest rates and the pressures to raise liquidity build, which would make illiquid investments fall relative to liquid ones.
Consistent with the mechanism's operation, the Federal Reserve's interest rate cuts and easing of credit supply in 2025 lowered the discount rate (which determines the present value of future cash flows) and reduced risk premiums, all of which contributed to the aforementioned results.
These changes have supported asset prices that perform well in a reflationary environment, particularly longer-duration assets such as stocks and gold, making these markets no longer cheap. Furthermore, it's worth noting that these reflationary measures haven't provided much help to illiquid markets such as venture capital, private equity, and real estate—markets facing problems. If one believes the valuations indicated by venture capital and private equity (which most people don't), the liquidity premium is currently very low.
I believe it is obvious that as these entities have to finance their debt at higher interest rates and face increased financing pressures, the liquidity premium is likely to rise significantly, which will cause illiquid investments to fall relative to liquid investments.
In summary, just about everything went up a lot in dollar terms because of the big fiscal and monetary reflationary policies and are now relatively expansive.
In short, due to massive fiscal and monetary reflation policies, almost all dollar-denominated assets have risen sharply, and these policies are now relatively loose.
One cannot look at the changes in the markets without looking at the changes in the political order, especially in 2025. Because markets and the economy affect politics and politics affect markets and the economy, politics played a big role in driving markets and economies. More specifically in the US and for the world:
When observing market changes, one cannot ignore changes in the political order, especially in 2025. Because the market and economy influence politics, and politics in turn influences the market and economy, politics plays a crucial role in driving market and economic development.
More specifically, in the United States and in the world:
a) the Trump administration's domestic economic policies were and still are a levered bet on the power of capitalism to revitalize American manufacturing and enable American AI technology, which contributed to the market movements I described above,
a) The Trump administration's domestic economic policies have been, and remain, a leveraged bet on capitalist forces, hoping to revitalize American manufacturing and promote the development of American artificial intelligence technology, which fueled the market shifts I described above.
b) its foreign policy has scared and turned off some foreign investors as fears of sanctions and conflicts supported the sort of portfolio diversification and buying of gold that we saw, and
b) Its foreign policy has instilled fear and deterred some foreign investors, who are concerned about sanctions and conflict, which has supported the portfolio diversification and gold buying behavior we have seen.
c) its policies increased wealth and income gaps because the “haves” (those in the top 10%), who are capitalists, have more wealth in stocks and because their income gains were bigger.
c) Its policies have widened the wealth and income gap because the “property owners” (the top 10%) are capitalists who have more wealth in stocks and greater income growth.
As a result of c), those capitalists who are in the top 10% now don't see inflation as a problem, while the majority (those in the bottom 60%) feel overwhelmed by it. The value of money issue, otherwise known as the affordability issue, will probably be the number one political issue next year, contributing to the Republicans losing the House and a very messy 2027 on the way to a very interesting 2028 election in which the clash between the right and the left is shaping up to be a big one.
Therefore, according to c), the top 10% of capitalists do not see inflation as a problem now, while the majority (the bottom 60%) are struggling to breathe under the weight of inflation.
The issue of currency value, or affordability, may become the most important political issue next year, which could lead to the Republicans losing the House of Representatives and a very chaotic 2027, leading to a very interesting 2028 election—where the conflict between the right and the left is gradually evolving into a major showdown.
More specifically, 2025 was the first year of the Trump four-year term in which he had control of both houses, which is classically the best year for presidents to push through what they want, so we saw his administration's all-out aggressive bet on capitalism—ie, the aggressively stimulative fiscal policy, reducing regulations so that money and capital would be more plentiful, making it easier to produce most things, raising tariffs to both protect domestic producers and to bring in tax revenue, providing proactive supports to key industries' production. Behind these moves, there was a Trump-led shift from free-market capitalism to government-directed capitalism.
More specifically, 2025 marks the first four-year term of Trump's administration under bicameral control, which is typically the most favorable year for a president to pursue his ambitions. As a result, we are seeing his administration make a full-blown aggressive bet on capitalism—namely, massive fiscal stimulus, deregulation to make money and capital more abundant, streamlining production processes to make it easier to produce most goods, raising tariffs to both protect domestic producers and generate tax revenue, and providing aggressive support for the production of key industries.
Behind these measures lies a shift led by Trump from free-market capitalism to government-led capitalism.
Because of how our democracy works, President Trump has a two-year unimpeded mandate that can be weakened greatly in the '26 mid-term elections and reversed in the '28 elections. He must feel that this doesn't give him enough time to get done what he believes he needs to get done. Nowadays, it is rare for one party to be able to stay in power for long because it is difficult for them to live up to their promises to satisfy their electorates' financial and social expectations. In fact, there is reason to question the viability of democratic decision-making when those in office are to govern long enough to meet the voters' expectations. It is becoming a norm in developed countries to see populist politicians from the left or the right who advocate for extreme policies to bring about extreme improvements and then fail to deliver and are thrown out of office. led by President Trump, and the hard left. On Jan 1, we saw the opposition coalescing as Zohran Mamdani, Bernie Sanders, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez united at Mamdani's inauguration behind the anti-billionaire, “Democratic socialist” movement. This will be a fight over wealth and money that will likely affect the markets and economies.
Because of how our democracy works, President Trump has a two-year unhindered mandate, but this could be significantly weakened in the 2026 midterm elections and reversed in the 2028 elections.
He would certainly feel that this time is insufficient to accomplish what he believes must be accomplished. Today, it is difficult for a political party to maintain long-term rule because fulfilling promises and meeting voters' expectations in economic and social spheres is extremely challenging. In fact, when those in power cannot remain in power long enough to meet voters' expectations, there is reason to question the viability of democratic decision-making.
In developed countries, it is increasingly common for populist politicians from the left or right to advocate extreme policies promising significant improvements, only to be ousted after failing to deliver on their promises. This frequent shift from one extreme to another is destructive, as has happened in less developed countries in the past.
Regardless, it is becoming increasingly clear that a major clash is brewing between the far right and far left, led by President Trump. On January 1, we saw the opposition begin to unite, with Zohran Mamdani, Bernie Sanders, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez rallying behind the anti-billionaire "democratic socialist" movement at Mamdani's inauguration.
This will be a battle over wealth and money, which could impact markets and the economy.
Regarding how the world order and geopolitics are changing, in 2025 there was a clear shift from multilateralism (in which there is an aspiration to operate by rules overseen by multilateral organizations) to unilateralism (in which power rules and countries operate in their self-interest). That raised and will continue to raise threats of conflict and lead to increased military spending, and borrowing to finance it, in most countries. It also contributed to the increased use of economic threats and sanctions, protectionism, deglobalization, many more investment and business deals, more foreign capital promised to be invested in the United States, strengthening demand for gold, and reduced foreign demand for US debt, dollars, and other assets.
Regarding changes in the world order and geopolitics, 2025 will see a clear shift from multilateralism (i.e., the desire to operate under rules overseen by multilateral organizations) to unilateralism (i.e., power-driven, with states acting according to their own interests). This will exacerbate and continue to exacerbate the threat of conflict, leading most countries to increase military spending and borrow money for this purpose.
This has also led to increased use of economic threats and sanctions, protectionism, deglobalization, more investment and business transactions, more foreign capital inflows committed to the United States, increased demand for gold, and reduced foreign demand for U.S. debt, the dollar, and other assets.
Regrading acts of nature, the progression of climate change continued while there was a politically led Trump shift in spending money and energy encouraging production in an attempt to minimize the issue.
Regarding natural phenomena, climate change continues, while the political shift led by Trump attempts to minimize the problem by increasing spending and encouraging energy production.
Regarding technology, obviously the AI boom that is now in the early stages of a bubble had a big effect on everything. I will soon send out an explanation of what my bubble indicators are showing, so I won't get into that subject now.
Regarding technology, the current AI boom, which is clearly in its early stages of a bubble, is clearly having a significant impact on everything. I will soon release an explanation of what my bubble indicator shows, so I won't go into detail about that topic now.
That's a lot to think about, and we didn't cover much about what's going on outside the US. I have found that having an understanding of the patterns of history and the cause/effect relationships that drove them, having a well back tested and systemized game plan, and using AI and great data is invaluable. That's how I play the game and what I want to pass along to you.
This involves a lot of thought, and we haven't discussed much about what's happening outside the US. I've found that understanding historical patterns and the causal relationships that drive them, having well-backtested and systematic action plans, and leveraging artificial intelligence and high-quality data are all invaluable. This is how I play this game, and this is what I hope to teach you.
In summary, this approach has led me to believe that the debt/money/markets/economy force, the domestic political force, the forces of geopolitics (eg, increased military spending and borrowing to finance it), the force of nature (climate), and the force of new technologies (eg, the costs and benefits of AI) will continue to be the major drivers shaping the whole picture, and that these forces will broadly track the Big Cycle template I laid out in my books. As I have already gone on for too long, I won't go deeper into all this now. If you read my book
How Countries Go Broke: The Big Cycle
, you know what I think about how the cycle will evolve, and if you want to learn more and haven't read it, I suggest that you do.
In short, this approach leads me to believe that debt/currency/market/economic forces, domestic political forces, geopolitical forces (such as increased borrowing to boost military spending), natural forces (climate), and new technological forces (such as the costs and benefits of artificial intelligence) will continue to be the primary drivers shaping the overall situation, and these forces will broadly follow the grand cycle template I outlined in my book. Given that I've already said too much, I won't elaborate further now. If you've read my book, *How Nations Go Bankrupt: The Grand Cycle*, you'll know my perspective on how cycles evolve; if you want to learn more and haven't read it yet, I recommend you do.
As for portfolio positioning, while I don't want to be your investment advisor (meaning I don't want to tell you what positions to have and have you simply follow my advice), I do want to help you invest well. Though I think you can surmise the types of positions I like and don't like, the most important thing for you to have is the ability to make your investment decisions yourself, whether to place your own bets on which markets will do well and poorly, or to build a great strategic asset allocation mix that you stick with, or to pick managers who will invest well for you. If you want my advice about how to do these things well to help you be successful at investing, I recommend the
Dalio Market Principles
course which is put out by the Wealth Management Institute of Singapore.
Regarding portfolio allocation, while I don't want to be your investment advisor (meaning I don't want to tell you what positions to hold and then have you blindly follow my advice), I do want to help you invest well. Although I imagine you can already deduce the types of positions I like and dislike, the most important thing for you is to have the ability to make your own investment decisions:
Whether you're betting on which markets will perform well or poorly, building and maintaining a strong strategic asset allocation portfolio, or choosing a manager who can make good investments for you, if you want my advice to help you do these things and succeed in investing, I recommend the "Dalio Market Principles" course offered by the Singapore Wealth Management Institute.
* Since we won't have this info with certainty until Q4 results are reported, these are estimates.
* These are estimates as we will not be able to confirm this information until the fourth-quarter financial report is released.
** When these things decline, it exerts upward pressure on stocks.
When these items decline, it puts upward pressure on the stock price.
