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Marcin (wartime arc) ๐ NYC DAS ๐บ๐ธ
10,314 Twitter followers
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Co-Founder @redstone_defi Oracles โฆ๏ธ Summoner @ETHWarsaw
Posts
Marcin (wartime arc) ๐ NYC DAS ๐บ๐ธ
03-04
Something you might not have noticed due to the eventful weekend. A manipulation attack against Curve Lend (LlamaLend) - using sDOLA as collateral. The @CurveFinance / @InverseFinance sDOLA incident is a very interesting case for oracle manipulation risk. The attacker walked away with ~$240K. Funded and returned through Tornado Cash. The attack in 4 steps: 1. Soft-liquidate all sDOLA suppliers on LlamaLend โ converts collateral into crvUSD 2. Donate to sDOLA pool โ manipulate oracle price from ~1.188 to ~1.358 sDOLA/DOLA (a +14% move) 3. Hard-liquidate all previously soft-liquidated users โ attacker pockets the crvUSD surplus 4. Deposit the gained sDOLA back into Curve Lend, borrow crvUSD โ repay the $30M flash loan Why does the oracle price going UP cause liquidations? Curve Lend's soft-liquidation uses an AMM built around the oracle price. When price moves sharply - even upward - users suffer instant impermanent loss (IL) inside the AMM. That IL is realized before the hard-liquidation check kicks in. So even "collateral going up in value" can get you wiped out. Root cause: Curve Lend's liquidation mechanism is incompatible with atomically-manipulable oracles. sDOLA's donation mechanism isn't broken in isolation. It only becomes exploitable when paired with a liquidation system that doesn't account for instant, single-block price manipulation. The broader lesson for oracle design: โ Liquidation logic must assume oracles CAN be manipulated within a single block โ TWAP or manipulation-resistant feeds matter even more in lending contexts โ Composability risk is real - protocol A can be safe while protocol B makes it dangerous This is exactly the kind of infrastructure risk that oracle providers need to solve at the root level. Silver lining is that @InverseFinance confirmed DOLA itself is safe sDOLA holders not on LlamaLend are actually up ~14% from the donation DOLA briefly traded at ~1% discount. Hope that visualisation helps in understanding the sequence.
CRV
1.14%
Marcin (wartime arc) ๐ NYC DAS ๐บ๐ธ
11-06
Liquidations, defaults, bad debt. Events of the last month showcase what's needed. Unified DeFi Risk ratings - coming to Morpho and Spark. The whole lending category will mature further with ratings. twitter.com/MarcinRedStone/sta...
Marcin (wartime arc) ๐ NYC DAS ๐บ๐ธ
11-06
Credora Risk Ratings by @redstone_defi are returning to Morpho. Curators can now opt in to independent risk ratings from Credora to help surface vault risks and provide users with additional insights to make informed decisions. Learn more โฌ๏ธ twitter.com/MorphoLabs/status/...
RED
1.25%
Marcin (wartime arc) ๐ NYC DAS ๐บ๐ธ
11-06
Thread
#Thread#
DeFi Ratings is what this industry needs. It will come sooner than you think.
David
@_dsencil
11-05
I had a conversation with @MarcinRedStone who spoke about the importance of having ratings in DeFi. From that conversation, which now seems prescient: "You could imagine a Morpho vault of Ethena SUSDe looping that is operated, for example by Gauntlet, we would rate that
Marcin (wartime arc) ๐ NYC DAS ๐บ๐ธ
11-04
Thread
#Thread#
Last 30 hours have been hard for DeFi. Here's a summary: 1. Moonwell $1M exploit, allegedly via Chainlink mispricing on wrstETH oracle. 2. Stream Finance xUSD goes down, with a ~$93 million loss of funds. 3. Balancer v2 and forks like Beets & BEX hacked for over $130M ๐
WELL
1.54%
Marcin (wartime arc) ๐ NYC DAS ๐บ๐ธ
11-04
Thread
#Thread#
.@MoonwellDeFi has been exploited for $1M. The root cause was a heavy oracle price inaccuracy for wrstETH. Not sure if further malicious actions have already been prevented. Please be careful. Fingers crossed for the Chainlink and Moonwell teams in addressing the issue.
LINK
0.35%
Marcin (wartime arc) ๐ NYC DAS ๐บ๐ธ
11-03
Thread
#Thread#
Following the Balancer exploit and vulnerability on BEX, Berachain validators halted the Berachain network. There's an emergency hard fork ongoing to address the exploit on BEX.
Berachain Foundation
@berachain
11-03
The Berachain validators have coordinated to purposefully halt the Berachain network as the core team performs an emergency hard fork to address Balancer V2 related exploits on the BEX. This halt has been executed purposefully, and the network will be operational shortly upon
BERA
1.01%
Marcin (wartime arc) ๐ NYC DAS ๐บ๐ธ
11-03
Thread
#Thread#
Balancer v2 exploit is still ongoing, alongside its forks. Close to $130M stolen so far.
BAL
0.44%
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