Another piece of evidence that this was a premeditated and orchestrated attack is the incredibly delicate timing: the announcement came just after Binance announced the oracle price adjustment, but before the actual adjustment took place on the 14th. Indeed, Binance's risk management team was already alert, but the attacker exploited the timing. Finally, the design director of the liquidation price feed commented: The public chain's POS mechanism is native. Even if a hard floor is implemented to account for liquidity discounts, the liquidation price feed should have a hard floor, not the spot price. Especially in margin trading within exchanges, the risk of exchange absconding is inherent. While the USDE's 1:1 fixed exchange rate is debatable, the lessons of the Luna UST incident are still fresh in our minds. At that time, Binance was forced to defend heavily against UST at 0.7, resulting in significant losses. Instead of using USDE as margin for the unified contract account, perhaps constraining the maximum position size supported by margin based on market liquidity elasticity is a more reasonable design.