ZK-verifiable matching is a way to run a fast, private orderbook while still giving users a cryptographic guarantee that the matching engine followed the rules. The problem it solves is simple: a CLOB needs an operator (or a small set of operators) to match orders quickly, but that operator can also cheat (reorder, skip, or selectively fill). ZK changes the trust model: the operator can stay fast, but can’t finalize an update unless they prove it was computed correctly. 𝗛𝗼𝘄 𝗶𝘁 𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸𝘀 (𝗰𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗲𝗽𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆) ➤ Orders are collected and matched off-chain (so you can get low-latency execution). ➤ Instead of publishing the full order flow, the system publishes: - 𝘢 𝘤𝘰𝘮𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘣𝘢𝘵𝘤𝘩 / 𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 (𝘰𝘧𝘵𝘦𝘯 𝘢 𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘳𝘰𝘰𝘵) - 𝘢 𝘻𝘬-𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘮𝘢𝘵𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘯𝘨 + 𝘳𝘪𝘴𝘬 𝘤𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬𝘴 + 𝘣𝘢𝘭𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘶𝘱𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘸𝘦𝘳𝘦 𝘥𝘰𝘯𝘦 𝘢𝘤𝘤𝘰𝘳𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘰𝘤𝘰𝘭 𝘳𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴, - 𝘦𝘯𝘰𝘶𝘨𝘩 𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘢 𝘢𝘷𝘢𝘪𝘭𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘴𝘰 𝘶𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘤𝘢𝘯 𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘦𝘹𝘪𝘵 𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯 𝘪𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘰𝘳 𝘥𝘪𝘴𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘦𝘢𝘳𝘴. That “enough data availability” is where @hibachi_xyz’s design choice is interesting: Hibachi is running a high-performance CLOB and posting encrypted state / trade data to @Celestia (so strategies and positions aren’t public), while still publishing proofs so updates remain verifiable, using SP1 (Succinct’s zkVM) to prove the CLOB. 𝗕𝘂𝘁 𝘄𝗵𝗮𝘁 “𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗰𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝗰𝗼𝗿𝗿𝗲𝗰𝘁” 𝗺𝗲𝗮𝗻𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗺𝘀? A zk-proof can enforce the same invariants you’d normally rely on an exchange operator to follow, for example: ➤ Orders were matched only when prices cross (no impossible fills). ➤ The fill sequence respected the venue’s priority rule (e.g., price-time priority, or whatever the venue specifies). ➤ Balances/margins were updated correctly (no hidden balance edits). ➤ Resulting state root is exactly what you get by applying the rules to the previous state root + the batch. You can keep the contents private (orders, sizes, positions) by encrypting what’s published to the DA layer, while the proof convinces everyone that the encrypted update is still a valid state transition.