Original title: The Singularity of the Mechanism, the Starting Point of the Bull Market: Short Selling Rights Are the Puzzle Piece That Will Spark the Next Round of Altcoin Bull Markets
Original author: danny, crypto analyst

Throughout the three centuries of financial markets, a repeatedly validated pattern has emerged: bull markets are never ignited by a particular narrative, but rather by upgrades in trading mechanisms. Whether it's ICOs, perpetual contracts, AMMs, DeFi, or NFTs... they all involve mechanisms driving competition, and competition leading to the circulation of funds. It is the upgrading of mechanisms that brings prosperity.

Looking back at the starting point of each major market trend, you'll find that what they have in common is not "the emergence of a good story," but rather "market participants suddenly gaining a new way of playing the game."

What ignites the next boom is never the narrative, but the evolution of each trading mechanism.

This pattern has never failed, from Wall Street to Binance, from spot to futures, from DeFi Summer to Hyperliquid.

You can short it—that is, equal rights to short are the key to the next Altcoin bull market.

I. In 1609, a Dutch merchant changed the history of finance.

Amsterdam, 1609.

The Dutch East India Company (VOC) was the world's largest publicly traded company at the time, monopolizing the Asian spice trade, and its stock price only went up. Everyone was buying, and everyone was making money. The market only had one direction—up.

Then a businessman named Isaac le Maire did something that everyone thought was crazy at the time: he borrowed VOC stock, sold it, and bet that it would fall.

This is the first recorded short transaction in human history.

The Dutch government was furious. Parliament considered it a malicious attack on a pillar of the nation's economy and passed legislation banning short. Le Maire was publicly condemned. But the story didn't end there—despite repeated bans, short selling never truly disappeared in Amsterdam. Market participants discovered an undeniable fact: with short, prices became more realistic. Overvalued stocks could no longer sustain their false prosperity indefinitely.

Four hundred years later, the crypto market is repeating the same script. In a market teeming with thousands of Altcoin, there is only buying, no short. Prices reflect only half of the optimism, while pessimistic voices are forcibly silenced. Every market cycle is the same: FOMO drives prices up, the bubble bursts, leaving a mess, and then the next narrative begins.

But history has shown us that the introduction of short rights is not the end of the market, but rather the beginning of it.

II. Two Hundred Years of Wall Street: How Short Transformed from "Enemy of the Nation" to "Cornerstone of the Market"

1792-1840s: The Wilderness Era – A Primitive Market Where Only Long Was Possible.

On May 17, 1792, 24 brokers signed the Buttonwood Agreement under a sycamore tree on Wall Street, agreeing to trade stocks among themselves. This was the precursor to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).

The market back then was similar to today's Altcoin market: you could only buy, hold, wait for dividends, and wait for the New Year. There was no leverage, no short, and no standardized settlement process. The average daily trading volume was probably less than $500,000, with only a few dozen participants. The market was extremely small because there was so little that could be done.

Price fluctuations are entirely driven by bullish sentiment. Good news arrives, everyone buys, and prices soar. Bad news arrives, everyone wants to sell, but because the market is too shallow, they can't sell, and prices crash. No short sellers cover their positions during the decline, so the market lacks natural support, and the bottom depends entirely on when the last bull gives up.

Doesn't this resemble the Altcoin market of 2024-2025, characterized by memes, high FDV, and low float?

1850s-1860s: Short takes center stage – fear and prosperity arrive simultaneously.

In the 1830s and 1840s, a trader named Jacob Little made a fortune by short and was known as "Wall Street's first big short seller." However, short truly became a mainstream weapon in the decade before and after the Civil War.

Daniel Drew, Jay Gould, Cornelius Vanderbilt—these names defined Wall Street in that era. They waged a series of epic battles between bulls and bears over railroad stocks: Drew short Erie Railroad, while Gould and Fisk teamed up to attack Vanderbilt's long positions. These battles were bloody, chaotic, and rife with fraud, but the objective result was that short transformed from a secret weapon of a few into a standard tool on Wall Street.

The social reaction was strikingly similar to that in Holland in 1609. Members of parliament denounced short as "enemies of the state," and newspapers said they "profited from the misfortunes of others." Public fear of short has remained virtually unchanged for four centuries.

But the market's response was just as positive and enthusiastic as it was four hundred years ago:

Every short creates a sell order, but also inevitably creates a buy order in the future (short covering). Increased trading volume narrows price spreads, attracting more participants. Wall Street transforms from a small circle of a few dozen people into a true capital market.

The Great Crash of 1929 → The Uptick Rule of 1938: the peak of fear and the turning point .

In October 1929, Wall Street crashed. The Dow Jones Industrial Average plummeted by nearly 90% in two years. Public anger needed an outlet, and short sellers became the most convenient target—although the real culprits were the rampant leverage bubble and the systemic collapse of the banking system.

In 1934, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established. Short once again faced the danger of being completely banned. But the SEC made a historic choice: in 1938, it did not ban short, but instead introduced the "uptick rule" (Rule 10a-1)—short short could only be executed when the stock price was rising, preventing short sellers from continuously dumping shares.

The significance of this choice cannot be overstated. It established a principle that continues to this day: short should not be eliminated, short regulated. Rules are not the enemy of short; rules are the prerequisite for the legitimacy of short.

With rules in place, short is no longer a gray area. Institutional funds, which were previously hesitant about short, are now more willing to participate on a large scale thanks to the legal framework. Regulation hasn't killed short; rather, it has made it safer and more credible, attracting more capital to the market.

The crypto market has yet to truly learn this lesson.

1973: Options standardization – from one direction to four directions.

On April 26, 1973, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) opened. On the first day, only call options on 16 stocks could be traded. Put options were added in 1977. That same year, Fischer Black and Myron Scholes published the Black-Scholes option pricing model, which revolutionized financial history and provided the mathematical foundation for options trading.

The significance of options lies in the fact that they expand the dimensions of market speculation from two (buy/sell) to four (buy call/buy put/sell call/sell put). For the first time, investors can express their judgments about the market in a very precise way—not just "whether it will go up or down," but "when, at what speed, and by how much."

More importantly, options provide institutional investors with a complete hedging arsenal. The great bull market of the 1980s (the S&P 500 rose by over 2200% between 1982 and 2000) was directly triggered by Volcker's control of inflation, Reagan's tax cuts, and deregulation, but options provided the risk management infrastructure that allowed institutions to dare to increase their positions. With hedging capabilities, institutions dared to take larger positions; with more people daring to take larger positions, more funds flowed in, and a bull market ensued.

For wealthy individuals and institutions, controlling drawdowns is more important than how much they can earn—uncontrollable risk means large funds cannot enter the market.

1996-1997: Retail investors broke in.

NASDAQ has been an electronic trading platform since its inception in 1971—the first of its kind in human history. The real changes that occurred in 1996-1997 were two things: the SEC's Order Handling Rules broke the market makers' monopoly on pricing; and online brokers (E*Trade, Ameritrade) reduced trading commissions from $50-$100 to below $10.

The bubble eventually burst, but NASDAQ's market capitalization remains far higher after the bubble burst than before the transformation—because the increase in participants brought about by infrastructure upgrades is irreversible.

1993-2010s: The maturation of a complete ecosystem.

Many people believe that ETFs are a product of the last decade, but the first ETF—SPY (tracking the S&P 500)—was listed on US stock exchanges in 1993. In 2001, the SEC mandated decimalization, narrowing the bid-ask spread from $0.125 to $0.01, significantly reducing transaction costs. Between 2005 and 2010, high-frequency trading (HFT) emerged, at one point accounting for over 60% of daily trading volume in the US stock market. Quantitative strategies, ETF arbitrage, long-short hedging—all types of strategies now have standardized tools to support them.

At this point, the system of trading tools for the US stock market is fully mature. Long, short, hedging, arbitrage—every type of strategy can find a suitable entry point. Result:

The pattern is crystal clear: prosperity arises whenever a new trading mechanism allows more people to participate in the market in more ways. (See diagram below)

III. Eight Years of Crypto Market Development: Two Hundred Years of Evolution Completed in Eight Years

What took Wall Street two centuries to complete—from Binance's launch in 2017 to the maturity of perpetual contracts—took less than eight years. But it got stuck at the Altcoin level.

2017 – The Year of the Sycamore Tree

Binance is now online, but only spot trading is available. The strategy is the same as that of a broker in 1792: buy, hold, and wait for the price to rise.

The ICO bubble is the best example. Everyone is buying, so prices can only rise. Then the buying power dries up—in a market without short sellers, there's no natural support without short covering, and prices freefall. The bottom depends on when the last bull gives up. Altcoin completely collapse. This is exactly the same market characteristic as the sycamore era of 1792.

2016-2019 – short weapons debut.

In May 2016, BitMEX launched the XBTUSD perpetual contract—the first short tool in the crypto market. In September 2019, Binance launched the BTC/USDT perpetual contract, short into the mainstream.

What happened? It's exactly the same thing that happened after short was introduced on Wall Street in the 1860s: liquidity exploded, price discovery became two-way, and volatility structurally decreased.

BTC's 30-day annualized volatility has decreased from over 150% during the 2017 bull market to 60-90% during the 2020-2021 bull market—the increase was greater, but the volatility is more orderly. Sharp rises and falls still occur, but the situation of "three months of low-volume declines" has significantly decreased, because short sellers will cover at certain price levels, forming natural support.

More importantly, the scale of capital has shifted dramatically. With hedging tools available, institutional funds are willing to enter the market on a large scale. You can't expect a fund manager managing billions of dollars to throw money into a market where you can only long and can't hedge. Perpetual contracts not only give retail investors the right to short, but they also provide the entire market with the infrastructure that allows "institutional investors to enter."

Derivatives' share of total trading volume rose from less than 10% in 2017 to approximately 90% in March 2026—derivatives have completely dominated pricing power in the crypto market.

Short didn't kill BTC. Short transformed BTC from a $10 billion speculative asset into a $2 trillion asset class.

2020-2021 – DeFi Summer: More Than Just a Narrative, It Was an Evolution of Mechanisms.

The options markets for BTC and ETH matured rapidly in 2020-2021 (primarily Deribit). This was the "CBOE moment of 1973" for the crypto market—institutions could not only short, but also precisely hedge and construct structured positions. The dimensions of strategies expanded from two-dimensional to a higher dimension.

Furthermore, many people categorize the DeFi Summer as a "narrative"—similar to the NFT craze and the metaverse concept, just another trend. But this is a fundamental misinterpretation. The essence of the DeFi Summer is not a narrative, but a structural leap in trading mechanisms.

AMMs (Automated Market Makers) have rewritten the underlying logic of trading. Before Uniswap, trading required order books, market makers, and centralized matching. AMMs overturned all of that—anyone can create a liquidity pool using two tokens, anyone can trade instantly without counterparty orders, and without anyone's permission. This isn't just a narrative; it's a paradigm shift in trading infrastructure. It enabled thousands of long-tail tokens that previously had no market to gain liquidity for the first time.

Lending protocols have created on-chain leverage and revolving strategies. Aave and Compound allow users to collateralize assets to borrow other assets—essentially on-chain margin trading. More importantly, it has spawned "revolving loans": collateralizing ETH to borrow stablecoins, using the stablecoins to buy more ETH, and then collateralizing again... This strategy is called leveraged long in traditional finance, and in DeFi it's packaged as "yield farming," but the underlying logic is exactly the same—it's a new way of playing the game, allowing participants to engage in the market with more multi-dimensional strategies.

Composability allows for exponential growth in mechanism innovation. AMM + lending + liquidity mining + cross-protocol arbitrage—these combinations of "money Lego" create strategic spaces never before seen in traditional finance. Each new combination represents a new way of participating, and each new way of participating brings new funds and new users.

Therefore, the super bull market of 2020-2021 was not due to the superposition of two factors, but three: the perpetual contracts/options of BTC and ETH provided institutions with channels for entry and exit, and the AMM and lending protocols of DeFi brought about a qualitative change in on-chain transaction mechanisms. The narrative is just the surface packaging of the evolution of these two mechanisms.

This once again confirms the same pattern: every evolution of the trading mechanism has spurred the next round of prosperity.

2021-2023 – Perpetual Expansion of Altcoin

Binance has started listing perpetual contracts for an increasing number of Altcoin. Each new coin listed on PERP experiences a significant jump in trading volume—not because listing on PERP is good news, but because the introduction of short tools allows more strategic funds to participate.

Quantitative funds can now make markets, hedge funds can engage in arbitrage, and trend traders can short. This diversity of participants directly translates to greater liquidity.

The pattern continues to hold true: BTC experienced a major bull market after getting perp, as did ETH and SOL; every Altcoin that got perp experienced a liquidity leap.

2023-2025 – The Time When Patterns Fail

Then, if nothing unexpected happens, something unexpected will happen. Just like in an idol drama, you'll encounter an "obstacle" around the corner, but it's an obstacle.

From the second half of 2023 to Q3 2025, Binance launched perpetual contracts for Altcoin at an unprecedented pace. New perp trading pairs were launched almost every week—from mainstream public chain tokens to AI concept coins, from GameFi to Memes, and even some projects with market capitalizations of only tens of millions received perpetual contracts.

On the surface, this appears to be a continuation of historical patterns: providing more short tools for more assets, creating more liquidity, and attracting more participants. Objectively speaking, these perpetual contracts are indeed creating liquidity out of thin air—a project with a FDV of billions but an actual circulating market capitalization of only tens of millions cannot support decent trading depth solely through the spot market. The market makers of perpetual contracts provide two-sided quotes using stablecoins, essentially injecting a layer of synthetic liquidity into these paper-thin markets.

But this time, the pattern didn't work.

The problem lies in the disconnect between "liquidity" and "confidence." Creating liquidity requires someone willing to gamble. But the reality in 2024-2025 is—everyone is afraid. The current market treats going up as the final destination, an exit signal, and news-driven trading.

Retail investors are scared. After the FTX collapse, the Luna crash, and countless Rug Pulls, retail investors' trust in Altcoin has plummeted.

Even more fatal is the distorted tokenomics of many newly listed projects on PERP: billions in FDV coupled with extremely low circulating supply, meaning a massive amount of tokens are waiting to be unlocked and dumped in the future. Retail investors aren't fools—you give me a tool to short, but the underlying asset itself is a well-designed, slow-draining machine; why should I participate? Whether I long or short, I don't want to touch it.

The market makers are scared. The launch of perpetual contracts means their market manipulation is exposed to short sellers.

Previously in the pure spot market, market manipulators could pump and dump their holdings at low cost, posing no threat to short sellers. With PERP, each pump can attract a large number of short positions, drastically increasing the cost of maintaining the price. Many project teams don't respond by engaging in a game of strategy; instead, they simply give up – they stop pumping and let the price naturally decline, selling the unlocked tokens gradually. Without pumping, there's no profit-making opportunity; without profit-making, no one trades.

Market makers are scared. That's the most crucial point.

Making perpetual contracts for a project with a daily spot trading volume of only a few hundred thousand dollars is extremely risky. The liquidity is too thin, prices are easily manipulated, and market makers struggle to hedge their inventory risk. In extreme market conditions, market makers may be unable to close out their positions. After several such failures, market makers begin tightening their quotes, widening spreads, reducing depth, and some even withdraw from the market altogether. Without market makers willing to work on a perpetual contract, liquidity is essentially nonexistent.

Worse still, those Altcoin perpetual contracts that are still in operation have become private casinos for big players.

For Altcoin with small circulating supply and concentrated holdings, market manipulators can do almost anything in the PERP market. Pumping the price doesn't require much capital—they control the supply in the spot market to drive up the price, while simultaneously profiting from short covering on PERP. Pumping the price is equally easy—they first open a short position on PERP, then dump the supply in the spot market, allowing the short sellers to profit. Repeatedly, PERP's high leverage becomes a tool for market manipulators to amplify profits, rather than a weapon for retail investors to hedge risks.

This kind of manipulation is far more destructive than market manipulation in the spot market. In the spot market, market makers deceive retail investors who buy at the bottom; in PERP (presumably a trading platform), market makers harvest profits from both long and short positions—regardless of whether you 'long or short, as long as you're on the opposite side of the market maker, your margin becomes their profit. Experienced traders dare not touch these counterfeit PERPs, while inexperienced traders who enter are repeatedly fleeced and eventually leave the platform forever.

Short tools are supposed to be a way to restrain market makers. But on the extremely illiquid altcoin PERP, the relationship is reversed: short tools have become another weapon in the hands of market makers. This damages not just the ecosystem of a single coin, but the trust within the entire crypto market. Every trader targeted and liquidated on PERP is a permanently lost user from the crypto market.

A paradox has emerged: Binance is listing more and more perp, but the trading volume and activity in the Altcoin market are actually shrinking.

What does this tell us? It means that the upgrade mechanism of perpetual contracts for Altcoin has reached its limit. Perp is a heavy machine that requires market makers, oracles, funding fees, and centralized approval to operate. BTC and ETH can afford to maintain this machine, but thousands of long-tail Altcoin cannot—the machine is running, but it's out of fuel. And those machines that are barely running have become cash cows for market manipulators.

IV. Why Perpetual Contracts Are Doomed to Fail for Altcoin

The results of the experiments from 2023 to 2025 have been presented, and here we will explain why from a mechanistic perspective.

A vicious cycle of liquidity. PERP requires market makers to provide two-sided quotes for stablecoins. Who would be willing to provide market maker services for an unknown project with a daily trading volume of hundreds of thousands of dollars? Without market makers, there is no liquidity; without liquidity, there are no traders; and without traders, market makers will not come. Spot leveraged short does not require building a derivatives market from scratch—borrow tokens and sell them in existing DEX pools. Lending protocols provide supply, and AMMs provide execution; the two are decoupled.

Two prices, two worlds. PERP and spot trading are two separate pools; when the pools are thin, a single trade can widen the price difference to an absurd degree. You might think you're short this project, but you're actually gambling in a parallel universe decoupled from spot trading. Spot leverage, from beginning to end, has only one market; there's no decoupling.

Funding rates are being manipulated. Market makers drive up the price of PERP to create extreme funding rates, draining short sellers' funds every few hours, even if they are on the right side of the trade. Even worse, market makers simultaneously manipulate both the spot market and PERP – pumping up the spot market while liquidating short positions in PERP. Spot leverage only involves lending rates, determined by supply and demand, and is not distorted by the long/short ratio.

Synthetic positions do not generate real selling pressure. This is the most crucial point. When short on PERP, no sell orders will appear in the spot market. Market makers are simply moving money from one hand to the other in the spot market, and shorting PERP poses no threat to them. Spot leveraged short involves borrowing real tokens to sell in the spot market—real selling pressure directly affects the price, and market makers must use real money to buy these orders in order to maintain a high price.

Approval + Oracle. PERP requires both exchange approval and a reliable oracle, both of which are lacking for smaller cryptocurrencies. On-chain lending and short do not require approval; the liquidation price depends on the AMM's real-time price.

Perpetual contracts are a heavy infrastructure, with operating costs exceeding the value they can create for long-tail assets. Altcoin need the lightest form of short short—borrow tokens, sell them, and buy them back to repay the loan if the price drops. This is spot leveraged short selling.

V. Fear of short, or fear of the lack of price discovery?

From Amsterdam in 1609 to Wall Street in the 1860s to Crypto Twitter in 2024, the fear of short has never changed. "Short will crash the market." "Short is a malicious attack." "Short will cause the market to collapse." — For four hundred years, the wording has remained almost unchanged.

But four hundred years of history have repeatedly proven the same fact: the cost of short of fear is far greater than short itself.

When criticism is not allowed, praise loses its meaning. When short selling is not allowed, long also loses its meaning.

Because in a market where you can only buy, prices only reflect half of the optimistic view. The pessimistic half—doubt, negative news, fraud—is forcibly muted. Everyone can only "like"; no one can "dislike."

Such prices are distorted, fragile, and unsustainable. They are not price discovery, but price illusion.

Long or short is the most basic respect for price discovery.

Only with genuine price discovery can a market have a sustainable future. Institutions dare to participate because prices are credible; market makers dare to participate because they can trade in both directions; long-term investors dare to participate because current prices have withstood the test of bears and are not lines drawn by market manipulators.

Conversely, a market without price discovery can only survive on narratives. Each wave of hype ends in chaos, then the next narrative attracts another wave of people to buy in. It's a perpetual cycle, never accumulating value.

The biggest tragedy in the Altcoin market isn't that there are too many market manipulators, but that it lacks even the basic conditions for price discovery. If prices aren't genuine, how can you talk about long-term value?

VI. Short is not a tool for shorting, but a catalyst for bull markets.

The most counterintuitive pattern in history: in the long run, every introduction of short mechanisms has not lowered prices, but rather raised them.

After short became widespread in the 1860s, NYSE trading volume increased tenfold in a decade, transforming Wall Street from a small circle into a true capital market. Following the legalization of short selling by the uptick rule in 1938, institutional funds entered the market on a massive scale, and the S&P 500 rose 340% in the following 30 years. After the introduction of CBOE options in 1973, options trading volume increased 10,000 times in 50 years, ushering in decades of continuous expansion for the US stock market. After the launch of BTC perpetual contracts in 2019, BTC volatility dropped from 150% to 50%, yet its market capitalization ballooned from $10 billion to $2 trillion.

Each time, the outcome is not a market crash, but a market expansion. There are three reasons for this:

1. Short creates liquidity – every short order is a sell order plus a future buy order (covering), and the more active the short, the deeper the liquidity.

2. Short attracts new participants – market makers, quantitative funds, hedge funds, and arbitrageurs are not there to dump the market, but to provide liquidity, and liquidity is the oxygen of a bull market.

3. Short builds trust – a price that has been tested by short sellers is a credible price. A credible price attracts real funds, and real funds drive real price increases.

A complete game theory tool does not destroy confidence, but builds it.

VII. The Path to the Next Bull Market

From Amsterdam in 1609 to the crypto market in 2025, four centuries of financial history have repeatedly verified the same pattern: first comes the evolution of mechanisms, then comes prosperity. This order cannot be reversed.

The current Altcoin market is trapped in a death spiral: only long are allowed → the business model is too simplistic → fewer and fewer people are making money → fewer and fewer people are trading → liquidity dries up → market stagnation. Even gambling allows betting on big or small, so why can't Altcoin be shorted?

Perpetual contracts cannot solve this problem—as demonstrated by experiments from 2023-2025. Perp is heavy infrastructure that long-tail Altcoin cannot sustain. "Listing Perp" itself has become just another narrative trigger, like "listing in spot" or "listing in Alpha," turning into a pretext for news trading, detached from the essence of trading and speculation. Trading tools are meant to serve trading, but now they have become the objects of trading—for long-tail assets, Perp is structurally a flawed tool.

The correct path is on-chain " native spot leveraged short"—borrowing real tokens through over-collateralized lending, selling them in the spot market to generate real selling pressure, and participating in real price discovery. It eliminates the need for market makers to build the market from scratch, oracles to maintain the peg, funding rates to smooth out price spreads, and any approval from anyone.

This aligns with the historical trajectory of every short mechanism's emergence. Le Maire's short in 1609 wasn't approved by the Amsterdam trading platform. Short short on Wall Street in the 1850s wasn't designed by the NYSE. They were all created spontaneously by market participants—the tools came first, then the rules. What the SEC did in 1938 wasn't inventing short, but rather establishing a regulatory framework for short, a practice that had been operating for nearly a century.

On-chain short protocols all follow the same path.

When this happens—when an Altcoin is no longer just a one-way game of "buy and wait for the price to rise," but a real-money battle between bulls and bears in the spot market—the quality of the market will fundamentally change. Liquidity will return, participants will return, and funds will return. Not because there's a new story to tell, but because there's a new way to play.

If historical patterns continue to hold true—and we have no reason to believe they won't—then the trigger for the next Altcoin bull market will not be a new narrative, a celebrity shill, or a halving.

It will be an infrastructure upgrade: enabling thousands of long-tail Altcoin to access on-chain native spot leverage short tools—this is where the crypto has pricing power.

This time, it's not the case that BTC liquidity overflows into Altcoin, but the other way around.

VIII. Conclusion

In 1609, the Dutch government banned short, and le Maire was publicly condemned. In the 1860s, the US Congress denounced short sellers as enemies of the nation. After the 1929 crash, the public demanded the complete eradication of short. In 2024, "short" remains a vulgar term in the crypto community.

Four hundred years have passed, and people's fear of short has never changed.

But four hundred years of history have repeatedly proven the same thing: every time this fear is overcome and short is introduced into the market, the market does not collapse—it expands.

Amsterdam has become a global financial center. Wall Street has transformed from a sycamore-covered city into a trillion-dollar capital market. Binance has become a global marketplace. Bitcoin has grown from $10 billion to $2 trillion.

Currently, thousands of Altcoin are locked in a "long" cage. Without short, there is no price discovery; without price discovery, there is no trust; without trust, there is no sustainable prosperity. The entire market has degenerated into a single game of betting on "expectations"—fewer and fewer people are making money, fewer and fewer are participating, and it's becoming increasingly quiet.

For those Altcoin that barely managed to secure perpetual contracts, short has become a new tool for market manipulators to exploit, accelerating the erosion of market trust.

When criticism is not allowed, praise loses its meaning. When short selling is not permitted—or short is only the privilege of market manipulators—prices will never be true.

What's more terrifying than the fear brought by short is a market without price discovery.

Bull markets are never something you wait for; they are born from the evolution of mechanisms. And the core of each such evolution, from 1609 to the present day, has always been the same thing—

Give short selling rights back to the market .

Who's willing to join us and shout out, "Whether you're bullish or not, you can short it!" (inspired by @heyibinance)

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