Chainfeeds Summary:
One of the biggest news in the L2 space recently is that Taiko has launched its mainnet with multi-zk proofs, enabling two different zk provers supported by RISC Zero and Succinct. However, crypto researcher bartek.eth believes Taiko is more like an Optimistic Rollup: only a portion of blocks have zk proofs, with a cooling-off period mechanism similar to the fraud proof window.
Source:
https://x.com/bkiepuszewski/status/1858586713569771720
Author:
bartek.eth
Perspective:
bartek.eth: Taiko has a multi-proof system where higher-level proofs can cover lower-level proofs. The hierarchy is defined as: 1. SGX proof 2. ZK proof from RISC0 3. ZK proof from SP1 4. 1/8 minority guardian MSig 5. 6/8 majority guardian MSig. When you submit an SGX proof, it can be covered by any higher-level proof. Taiko does not force you to use ZkProofs, when you propose a block, you can use an SGX proof for it. They do force their provers to use ZK proofs to prove a small portion of blocks, but the majority of blocks they prove currently only have SGX proofs. So only a portion of blocks have Zk proofs. Unlike Zk Rollups where every L2 block must be proven through Zk Proofs, in Taiko, only a minority of blocks have Zk Proofs, the rest are SGX proofs or MultiSig proofs. Additionally, since each proof (except the top layer) can be challenged, there will be a "cooling-off period" - similar to the fraud proof window in Optimistic Rollups, during which you can challenge. Only after the cooling-off period will the new L2 state root on L1 be "finalized". This is why even with the introduction of ZkProofs, Taiko is still more like an Optimistic Rollup. They have a cooling-off period (fraud proof window), and some state roots don't have Zk proofs at all. So what is Taiko's current trust assumption? It turns out it's still quite weak. If a malicious proposer successfully bribes 3 out of the current 8 MultiSig signers (i.e. the minority), then a malicious state root can simply be added by one of them (i.e. 1/8 MultiSig). This malicious state root cannot be challenged, because the next (and final) proof level is 6/8 MultiSig, and if there are 3 malicious members, quorum cannot be reached. So this malicious state root will be finalized after the cooling-off period. A minority of malicious users can impact the system's security (i.e. steal user funds), which makes Taiko still at Stage 0. I hope they can move to Stage1 soon - they seem to have all the necessary ingredients for Stage1 already.
Source
