Full Account of the Incident: A Bloodbath Caused by a Vulnerability in Permission Transfer
Timeline Restoration:
On February 24, 2024, the Infini platform faced a major security crisis. Hackers gained control of the governance rights of Infini's multi-signature wallet and, exploiting this vulnerability, transferred out 50 million USDC in batches within 40 minutes. On-chain data shows that the hackers used a mixer to transfer the stolen funds to exchanges and cash out, exhibiting the characteristics of professional hackers. This incident exposed significant loopholes in Infini's permission transfer process, while the hacker's operations demonstrated their high level of professionalism and precise grasp of the platform's vulnerabilities.
Crisis Response:
After the incident, Infini founder Christian quickly issued a statement in an attempt to calm the market and users. The statement pointed out that the core issue stemmed from previous process loopholes in the permission transfer, as the control of the old permission node was not completely removed, providing an opportunity for the hackers. To make up for the losses, Christian promised that 70% of the affected large users' funds would be personally borne by him, and the remaining part would be replenished before next Monday. At the same time, to prevent a second attack, Infini decided to temporarily suspend the financial contract and keep the withdrawal channel open to ensure the safety of user funds.
Public Opinion Fermentation:
However, as the incident continued to escalate, on-chain detective ZachXBT questioned the emergency response mechanism of Circle. ZachXBT pointed out that the 24/7 risk control system promised by USDC issuer Circle was essentially illusory. During the process of the hackers quickly laundering money through centralized exchanges, the regulatory loopholes were exposed, further exacerbating market concerns about the effectiveness of stablecoin regulation. In the handling of this incident, the platform's emergency response mechanism, compensation plan, and subsequent risk control upgrade measures have become the focus of public discussion.
The Truth of Circle's "Indifference": The Double Standard of Selective Freezing
The Inherent Contradiction of the Backdoor Mechanism
Although Circle, the issuer of USDC, has reserved the freezing power in the contract code, its actual response mechanism reveals a worrying operational logic - "regulatory priority, user secondary". For example, in 2023, Circle successfully froze $65 million in funds in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Justice, clearly demonstrating their ability to respond quickly and take action. However, during the Infini incident, despite the huge amount and far-reaching impact of the stolen funds, Circle did not initiate an emergency response and selectively executed the freezing measures, exposing its sluggish reaction when facing user funds.
When it comes to stolen funds, especially when these funds involve large exchanges or institutional accounts, Circle's freezing decisions are often full of complex business interest games. This means that in some cases, its priority is the interests of regulators and partners, rather than fully protecting the financial security of ordinary users.
Furthermore, in this incident, the hackers quickly transferred the stolen assets across chains and through mixers, requiring Circle to coordinate the judicial procedures of multiple countries to freeze these funds, and the complexity of this operation further exacerbated the difficulty of emergency response.
The Collapse of the Decentralization Promise
When ZachXBT publicly questioned Circle's emergency mechanism, he directly hit the industry's pain point - the "24/7 around-the-clock monitoring" promised in USDC's whitepaper is illusory. This incident exposed a cruel reality: although Circle and other stablecoin issuers repeatedly claim that they provide decentralized, censorship-resistant stablecoins, these stablecoins are still deeply controlled by centralized mechanisms in actual operation. When an incident occurs, the freezing power is not a shield to protect user assets, but a weapon serving regulatory needs, hiding the compromise of selective execution and power struggles.
For users, when hackers can circumvent regulatory red lines (such as not involving terrorist financing), Circle and other issuers often lack sufficient motivation to initiate rescue measures. In this context, users become the victims of this power struggle, unable to receive timely protection and assistance.
Self-Rescue Alliance in the Power Vacuum: The Rise of Community Security Infrastructure
Decentralized Emergency Response Network
As centralized institutions respond slowly, decentralized community security infrastructure is gradually emerging to fill this void. Decentralized insurance protocols like Nexus Mutual use smart contracts to achieve automatic compensation, providing another security guarantee for users affected by attacks. In addition, the Immunefi platform has established a vulnerability crowdsourcing and repair mechanism, offering generous rewards of up to $10 million for white hat hackers. This bounty system not only encourages community members to actively discover and report vulnerabilities, but also drives the entire crypto industry to improve its security.
Anti-Freezing Asset Matrix
In the face of growing security threats, the censorship resistance of assets has become a focus of investor attention. Decentralized stablecoins have become an important tool to prevent asset freezing. Algorithmic stablecoins like DAI and FRAX provide a certain degree of censorship resistance, but their risk factors are still at a medium level. In comparison, over-collateralized stablecoins like LUSD and MIM have relatively lower risk in terms of risk control, suitable for conservative investors. However, privacy stablecoins like XUSD and Zcash provide the strongest privacy protection, but their risk factors are also higher, requiring more cautious allocation.
Democratization of Security Tools
With the rise of the open-source audit revolution, platforms and communities are also beginning to pay more attention to the democratization of security tools. CertiK has launched a community co-audit platform, allowing any developer to participate in the inspection of contract vulnerabilities, enhancing the transparency and credibility of contract code. At the same time, AI defense assistants like Forta Network can accurately warn of abnormal transactions on the chain in real-time, with a warning accuracy of 92%. These technical tools provide strong protection for community members, allowing them to take defensive measures before hacker attacks occur and avoid losses.
Conclusion: From "Decentralization" to "Self-Rescue"
The Infini incident has revealed the deep-seated problems hidden in the crypto market: the decentralized security guarantee we expect is not omnipotent. Centralized mechanisms, governance permission loopholes, and the failure of multi-signature systems have all exposed the fragility of crypto assets. The professionalization of hacker attack methods, the delayed emergency response of platforms, and the lack of a regulatory system have made the security situation in the crypto market exceptionally complex.
This crisis has sounded the alarm for all investors: in the context where "decentralization" is not omnipotent, self-rescue is the key to addressing future risks. Investors need to recognize the risks of decentralized stablecoins and gradually adopt more diversified, trustless asset allocation methods, while also strengthening technical protection for asset security. At the same time, platforms should increase transparency, improve emergency response mechanisms, and establish more robust risk control systems to cope with the increasingly complex market environment.
In the crypto market, the true security margin always depends on the depth of investor cognition and response capabilities. In the future, when external rescue becomes a luxury, community governance and code constraints will become our last line of defense.
