Author: Pepper Sichuan Pepper (X: @off_thetarget)
Tl'dr Conclusion
1. The 'external pool' (fools who are creating LPs on Raydium) are using their own tokens - > their tokens are all obtained from the bonding curve, and the external pool tokens are severely undervalued
Optimal strategy: Buy $send, buy the external pool $super, don't farm
2. If the external pool is higher than your farming cost, then you can go farming, the more you farm in the same time (5 min), the less points you get, reduce high-frequency operations, find Asian people's sleeping time, the points must be bought immediately after getting them, don't delay, it will get more expensive, you must farm as early as possible, the flywheel won't stop
3. The new model meme platform doesn't want platform tokens, but to exchange your expectations for the platform tokens for part of your fee income, the points can get $super tokens will become less and less, and the price of $super will become higher and higher, burning and redeeming points are related, and points are controlled by the function of trading volume + number of traders
4. The $super of the 'external pool' is the expected value/cost line of the first batch of $super farmers of the 'internal pool', when the gear starts to accelerate (n = 4-8), the 'internal pool' MC will take off and seriously mismatch the value of the 'external pool', because of the lack of liquidity, the 'external pool' is very likely to be pulled up (just remember that the two bonding curves are completely different, one is x * y = k, the other is x^n * y = K) the formula is different, the calculation method is different, the expectation is different, the farmers are too stupid to calculate it
Detailed Breakdown: The Misconception of 'Internal and External Pool/Infinite Pool' Market Value
1. Let's first look at the ordinary 'external pool' under the AMM mechanism
Previously, most AMM mechanisms were calculated using x * y = K, that is, the value of K fluctuates with the values of x and y, where x and y respectively represent the 'inventory' of the two tokens in the pair, and k is the liquidity parameter, which remains unchanged during each transaction process, and increases or decreases correspondingly during the process of adding and removing liquidity.
In short, liquidity decline - > price decline - > pool death.
Forced liquidity demand increases.
But the bonding curve of @_superexchange is infinite, and there is no distinction between internal and external pools.
2. Comparison between the internal pool of pumpfun and super exchange
The bonding curve of pumpfun is different from that of super exchange, although they both refer to the AMM model, but the joint curve of the virtual pool is different.
I referred to the previous analysis article:
"The pricing system of http://PUMP.FUN has a pre-virtual pool, in which the amount of $Sol is x 0, and the total token amount is y 0. By collecting the data of the platform users' buying $SOL and the corresponding tokens obtained, and fitting the x*y=k formula, the pre-virtual pool is 30 $SOL and 1073000191 tokens, the initial k value is 32190005730, and the price of each token is 0.000000028 $SOL"
On the Pumpfun side, before graduation, we divide several regions, assuming 20-40% as one region, 40% -80% as one region, 80% - 100% (graduation) as one region.
20% - 40%: The price formula is: y=k/x, the early price liquidity change: dy/dx=−k/x, that is, when x is small, the price is sensitive to purchases, and the liquidity is low.
40% -80%: As x increases, the liquidity is still low, and small purchases lead to rapid price increases.
80% -graduation: ∣dydx∣| becomes larger, a small purchase (x) causes (y) to plummet, unable to support large capital, a common manifestation is that after the internal pool reaches 80K, the bots quickly dump the pool, which can be dumped to 20-30K, showing the pool-draining behavior.
Summary: Forced liquidity demand increases.
Now let's take a look at super exchange.
Their formula is x^n * y = k, here n has 7 gear positions, n from 32 to 1.
When N = 32,
The change in liquidity here is: Liquidity change: dydx=−n⋅kxn+ 1, when n = 32, ∣dydx∣ is extremely small, the price is not sensitive to (x), and the liquidity is high.
In simple terms, the purchase of x has little impact on the price and continues to 'increase' liquidity.
When N = 8-4,
Liquidity change: ∣dydx∣=n⋅kxn+ 1, n decreases, ∣dydx∣ increases but is suppressed by xn+ 1, the market depth is stable.
In simple terms, as n decreases and x increases, the price starts to bulldoze up, but the depth is stable.
When N = 1,
Liquidity change: Liquidity change: ∣dydx∣=kx 2, as (x) increases, ∣dydx∣ decreases, the market depth is stable.
In simple terms, it can support larger capital entering and larger capital exiting, and there is no particularly large impact on the depth.
Summary: Forced liquidity demandincreases.
