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On April 2, 2025, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a financial and logistics intermediary network connected to the Iran-supported Houthi (also known as Ansar Allah). OFAC identified eight crypto asset wallets used to support Houthi weapons, procurement, and sanctions evasion. This network includes Russia-based actors and shipping companies that have facilitated the movement of weapons and stolen Ukrainian grain, as well as illegal payments worth millions of dollars, supporting Houthi destabilization activities in Yemen and the Red Sea region.
This blog will examine Houthi activities, verify the on-chain activities of the eight designated crypto asset addresses, and discuss their implications for counter-terrorism financing.
Houthi and Russian Weapons Procurement and Transportation Connections
Today's sanctions target the Ghairat brothers, Hushang and Sohrab, Russian residents with Afghan nationality who facilitated commercial activities on behalf of the Houthis, particularly Sa'id al-Jamal, whose crypto asset addresses were included in the December 2024 sanctions. Following al-Jamal's instructions, the Ghairat brothers directed weapon and stolen Ukrainian grain shipments, transporting goods from Crimea to Yemen using the Russian-flagged vessel Am Theseus (also known as Zafar).
The Hong Kong-registered owner of this vessel, AM Asia M6 Ltd., and the two captains (Russian nationals Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Vidanov and Vladimirovich Belyakov) were also sanctioned. These actors played a direct role in logistics that enabled Houthis to access sensitive items.
Sohrab Ghairat also holds leadership positions in three Russian companies: LLC Sky Frame, LLC Edison, and LLC Kolibri Group, all of which have been designated by OFAC as under Ghairat's control.
Houthi On-Chain Activities
The announced sanctions include eight crypto asset wallets controlled by the Houthis. These include six private wallet addresses and two deposit addresses for major services used to move nearly $1 billion in illicit funds. The Houthi network's on-chain activities align with the details in the OFAC designation, including significant fund transfers between Houthi wallets, al-Jamal's wallets, and Russian wallets.
Furthermore, the Houthis moved over $45 million through multiple deposit addresses of OFAC SDN Garantex and processed nearly $2.5 million related to wallets designated by Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing (NBCTF). This included addresses identified as involved in supporting Hamas, further highlighting Iran's proxy network supporting both Hamas and the Houthis. The Chainalysis Reactor graph below shows that Houthi wallets extensively utilize multiple major exchanges, receiving over $200 million at their cash-out points.
Crypto Asset Monitoring in Terrorist Financing
Today's OFAC actions are part of a broader U.S. strategy against the Houthis, designated in February 2024. While the Houthis have long depended on state sponsors like Iran, their increased ability to leverage commercial actors, crypto assets, and international shipping networks represents an evolving threat.
OFAC emphasizes that terrorist financing will face sustained pressure by targeting the financial infrastructure enabling missile attacks, drone attacks, and disruptions to security and international trade in the Red Sea region, regardless of crypto asset involvement.
We will continue to monitor this network and provide updates as possible.
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