The Sui Foundation successfully froze $160 million in stolen funds, temporarily preventing hackers from further malicious actions. However, under the magnifying glass of public opinion questioning "decentralization," everyone is now focusing on @SuiNetwork Foundation: What exactly do you plan to do with this money? Here are several possibilities:
Current constraints: $160 million in funds are locked by the deny_list, and any transactions involving the hacker's address will be rejected by validators. To unlock the funds, the following must be done:
- Whitelist mechanism (green channel): Bypass all security checks through 'transaction_allow_list_skip_all_checks', GitHub PR has been closed, but seems to be an inevitable choice;
- Hard fork: Directly modify protocol rules and on-chain state, a last resort with high costs and consequences;
- Permanent freeze: Do nothing, maintain the status quo, Sui completes an accidental "deflation".
Possible unlocking solution analysis (for reference only):
1) Whitelist mechanism + Community governance voting: Initiate an on-chain governance vote through a democratic process: "Agree to proportionally return frozen funds?" After voting passes, the Sui Foundation will add batch return transactions to the 'transaction_allow_list_skip_all_checks' whitelist, allowing transactions to bypass deny_list restrictions and execute fund transfers;
Adopting this approach appears to have community endorsement, with the foundation using whitelist super permissions, but SUI token distribution is already centralized, making the voting result seemingly entirely under the foundation's control, thus merely a "centralized" action disguised with a democratic veneer;
2) Pure whitelist mechanism return: Sui Foundation directly adds return transactions to the whitelist, bypassing deny_list and distributing funds to victims according to established rules.
This would make the foundation an de facto "super administrator" and completely destroy Sui's decentralization reputation;
3) Negotiate with hackers, proportional return: The current deny_list has already blocked the hacker's autonomous capabilities. Even if negotiations succeed, execution rights remain with the Sui Foundation, ultimately requiring whitelist mechanism release. Negotiation has no technical significance, and attempting to conceal whitelist actions would be tantamount to covering up the truth;
4) Hard fork to directly modify state: Release a new client version containing state modifications, directly rewriting asset ownership of frozen addresses at the protocol level, then wait for most validators to agree to upgrade to the new version.
This is similar to handling The DAO event in Ethereum's history, potentially risking validator network fragmentation, with a minority potentially persisting with the old chain like ETC. The blockchain's immutability would be forcibly changed. While technically thorough, for a new public chain, it would be playing with fire, especially given today's saturated market environment, unlike Ethereum's lenient circumstances in 2016;
5) Whitelist + Third-party regulatory compliance custody: Transfer frozen funds to a neutral institution through the whitelist mechanism, seeking endorsement from authoritative regulators like SEC and CFTC, executing decisions through public hearings.
This would make Sui a "model student" of crypto industry compliance. While it sounds far-fetched, remember that the Sui team's predecessor, Facebook's Libra, was previously targeted by regulatory agencies. If Sui handles this centrally, it might face further scrutiny. Instead of being attacked again, proactively surrendering might be better;
However, this would essentially use political compliance to mask the whitelist mechanism under centralization, and still cannot avoid public controversy;
6) Whitelist + DeFi fund long-term compensation mechanism: The foundation can develop a new fund management contract, transferring frozen funds to the fund contract through the whitelist, and injecting effective revenue through ecosystem economic activities, allowing users to obtain long-term linear release lock-up benefits;
The brilliance of this strategy is transforming victims into beneficiaries and critics into supporters, silencing meaningless market sentiment based on the principle that only those involved have the right to speak. However, this can only be considered a complex economic governance plan with significant implementation uncertainties;
7) Maintain status quo, permanent freeze, deflation: Abandon the idea of adding whitelists, with the foundation taking no additional actions, maintaining the current deny_list status. Frozen assets will forever be unable to circulate, equivalent to SUI asset "deflation".
8) Time difference arbitrage strategy: Long-term postponement of frozen fund issues, secretly accumulating positions when market confidence is lost and token prices drop, then suddenly announcing full compensation at the optimal moment. Can delay using technical complexity, governance difficulties, and legal compliance as reasons, while simultaneously leveraging market despair to buy large amounts of $SUI tokens at low prices, waiting for the next cycle or market-appropriate timing to make a one-time full compensation on the existing deflationary basis;
The above.
Note: The above possibility analysis is merely exploratory discussion. We await the Sui Foundation's final solution or potentially better strategies. Everyone is welcome to "brainstorm" in the comments section.
