Some say this is the worst oil crisis since the 1970s.
Gas stations in Thailand and Vietnam are out of gas, forcing people to work from home; South Korean chip factories are struggling with helium supplies; Japan has begun talks to buy oil from Alaska; and African food aid organizations are worried about where to find food if the war continues for another three months.
These events all happened this week, and the impact of war on the world is more chaotic than we imagined.
Since the outbreak of the Middle East war, the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively at a standstill, leaving nearly 20% of the world's crude oil and liquefied natural gas supply hanging in the balance. Oil prices jumped 40% from pre-war levels, reaching $110 per barrel, while Iran openly declared its goal to push that figure to $200. The bombing of Qatar's Ras Lafan LNG facility, a key supplier accounting for 20% of global natural gas trade, could require years to restore production.
So when will this war end, and how will it end? BlockBeats has compiled five of the most likely scenarios.
Around April, a swift and decisive battle
This is the ideal scenario, and some analysts believe it is the scenario Trump most desires: the war will end in the short term.
After all, Trump's mindset has never been like that of a general; it's more like that of a CEO who's done one deal and is ready to move on to the next. He himself has said: "The United States has won almost every battle in its history, but lost far too many wars, not because it couldn't win, but because it didn't know how to exit the battlefield after winning." Vietnam was like that, Iraq was like that, and Afghanistan was like that. He doesn't want to repeat that.
Therefore, in Operation Epic Fury, the U.S. military prioritized "precision decapitation" strikes against high-ranking Iranian officials and "demilitarization" strikes against nuclear capabilities, missile facilities, and naval forces. Once these "teeth" that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies have been completely removed, Trump plans to move the military operation into its final stages.
Based on the scenario outlined in this script, the ceasefire is expected to take place around April, with several corresponding time points.
The first key date is the visit to China. Trump's original plan was to visit China in late March or early April, but it has now been postponed to late April or early May. Trump does not want to be bogged down in the unresolved "Middle East turmoil" during his visit to Beijing; he needs to appear as a victor to gain more leverage in the US-China trade negotiations. Treasury Secretary Bessant also confirmed that the postponement was purely due to the need for military command, while trade negotiations were progressing smoothly in Paris. This means that the diplomatic path is open, waiting only for the military situation to be resolved.
The second key timeframe is the midterm elections. With the November midterms approaching, Trump needs a stable economic environment, especially stable oil prices and expectations of a Federal Reserve rate cut. If the war-induced inflationary shock lasts longer than six weeks, it will permeate the entire supply chain and be reflected in summer corporate earnings reports, putting the Republicans in a difficult position. He needs to bring oil prices down from their peak so that around September he can push the Federal Reserve to cut rates under the guise of a "jobs emergency," securing a decisive victory in the midterms.
Iran's offer was to buy a way out with oil commissions.
Currently, the negotiations between the US and Iran present a bizarre "Rashomon" situation: Trump claims that progress is going well, but Iranian Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf and state media have vehemently denied any contact whatsoever.
Trump recently revealed that his current partners are "a completely different group" who have offered a significant gift related to oil and gas, reportedly a 5% commission on Iranian oil sales paid directly to the United States. If true, this figure would be a substantial sum given Iran's export volume.
Who are these "completely different people"? They are most likely Iran's regular military (Artesh), not the well-known Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) loyal to the Supreme Leader. Deep-seated contradictions already exist between these two forces: the Artesh is the state's army, while the IRGC is an ideological tool. When survival pressures reach a certain level, it's not unprecedented, nor is it impossible, for moderates within the regular army to bypass the Supreme Leader and quietly contact the US.
However, from Iran's perspective, its insistence on "denying negotiations" also stems from certain political stances.
Iran is well aware that Trump highly values stock market performance. Immediately after the US announced a temporary halt to the strikes, global oil prices and US stocks quickly stabilized. By denying negotiations, Iran aimed to dilute Trump's economic "dividends" and prevent the US from gaining more leverage at the negotiating table. Secondly, it was about maintaining the legitimacy of its rule. For a mullah regime that relies on a tough-guy image to maintain its rule, openly making peace with the "Great Satan" would be tantamount to political suicide.
Some seasoned military analysts have pointed out that while threatening to bomb Iranian power plants, Trump recently eased sanctions on oil exports from Russia and Iran. This is not weakness, but rather a manifestation of Trump's "America First" logic. He needs Iranian oil to continue flowing into the market to stabilize inflation, but he will never allow Tehran to control the Strait of Hormuz. This "stick in one hand, green light in the other" approach essentially uses Iran's energy infrastructure as a dynamic lever, testing the other side's bottom line through a five-day grace period.
But this scenario has its pitfalls. Strategist Hansen offered a more sober assessment: this compromise is at best a "pause button" for the war; Iran's ideological foundation remains unshaken, and the next Revolutionary Guard, the next proxy armed group, will inevitably emerge sooner or later. A more realistic obstacle comes from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Crown Prince MBS's stance is very direct: the war cannot be abandoned halfway. In Saudi Arabia's view, stopping halfway through, leaving behind a resentful but still nagging Iran, is more dangerous than not fighting at all. Saudi Arabia is pressuring Trump to use this historic window to completely eliminate the hardline regime.
Furthermore, some analysts point out that Crown Prince Pahlavi, who has been in exile in the United States for nearly half a century, is gradually becoming the "greatest common denominator" of opposition forces within Iran. Perhaps for the United States, blocking the Strait of Hormuz is merely a tactical maneuver, while supporting Pahlavi (or a coalition government centered around him) to take power in Iran is the true "general's banner" that can fundamentally eliminate the Middle East energy threat and reshape the geopolitical landscape.
Reza Pahlavi, son of Iran's last Shah, who is now in exile.
Seize islands and control the strait, continue to strike Iran
If negotiations break down, or if Trump decides to escalate the conflict with military action while negotiating, the focus of the battle will shift to the small islands around the Strait of Hormuz.
Gom Island, Tumb Island, and Abu Musa Island—these are names that few people would normally mention, but they control the shipping lanes through which approximately one-fifth of the world's oil trade passes. Whoever controls these islands controls the "master switch" of the Middle East's energy landscape.
Iranian islands map
The US military's strategic intent here is quite clear: to bypass the quagmire of the Iranian interior and directly control the "valve" of the strait. This is a typical "maritime-centric" approach, not seeking occupation, but merely aiming to choke off the islands. The islands of Tumbu and Abu Musa have an additional value: they were originally disputed territories between the UAE and Iran. After the US military captured them, they were directly handed over to the UAE, establishing a long-term allied defense perimeter and delivering a significant political gift to the Gulf states.
Military analysts point out that signs of further troop deployments by the US military are quite evident. Recently, 17 C-17 transport aircraft have flown to the Middle East, six of which originated from Fort Bragg, the base of the 82nd Airborne Division and Delta Force. The 82nd Airborne Division's core capability is speed; it can deploy globally within 18 hours, and its advance forces are already in place. Amphibious Marines from Okinawa and California are responsible for long-range control of large islands, and their arrival will take another three to four weeks.
The so-called "five-day window" is actually to wait for the heavy expeditionary force to arrive at the designated position and to provide special operations units with a final period of terrain reconnaissance.
The most problematic variable is Kharg Island. This island accounts for 90% of Iran's oil exports and has extremely high strategic value. However, the island is dotted with large oil storage tanks, and if a fire breaks out, global oil prices will immediately spiral out of control, which is precisely the outcome that the United States itself cannot afford.
An analysis report by the Hudson Institute points out that the U.S. military struck more than 5,000 targets in the first ten days of the war. This high-intensity pace of "demilitarization" is essentially a 21st-century "war of industrial capacity stripping."
Therefore, this viewpoint argues that if a short-term resolution is not possible, and pressure continues, further military action is more likely to involve precision control by special forces rather than a direct confrontation. This is because the goal of the war is not necessarily to overthrow the Iranian regime, but rather to achieve "tactical weakening," similar to the Allied strikes against Germany's industrial capabilities in the later stages of World War II. The aim is to dismantle Iran's regional power projection capabilities accumulated over decades, including its nuclear facilities, ballistic missile production bases, and naval forces.
Ultimately, Iran may be weakened into a "large Hamas," meaning that while the regime survives, it will lose its ability to pose a substantial threat to the world within the next 10 to 20 years.
Jiang Xueqin's prediction: The United States will lose.
Jiang Xueqin has recently become a hot topic due to the repeated circulation of a video of him lecturing on international affairs in a Beijing high school classroom two years ago. In the video, Jiang Xueqin, based on historical and geopolitical logic, predicted that Trump might be re-elected and that the US might take action against Iran. As some of his predictions have been proven correct, his YouTube subscribers have skyrocketed, and he has been dubbed "China's Nostradamus" by many netizens. (Full interview translation: "Jiang Xueqin's Latest Interview: How to View Current Global Changes" )
His core argument regarding the Middle East war is that while the United States may win every battle tactically, it is losing the war strategically.
Why?
First, the US military is too cumbersome, while Iran is too agile. Iran has been preparing for this day for over two decades. It understands the US military's operational logic very well and has designed countermeasures for every possible scenario. The two aircraft carriers, the USS Ford and the USS Lincoln, are indeed there, but because Iran possesses hypersonic weapons and a massive number of suicide drones, the carriers dare not approach the Iranian coastline. These massive steel fortresses have become mere decorative structures floating in the distance. Internal US war games have repeatedly shown that the US would lose, not because of insufficient firepower, but because its system is ineffective against this type of adversary.
Secondly, once on land, it's a bottomless pit. Jiang Xueqin viewed the plan to seize Kharg Island as a classic sunk cost trap. The island was captured, but it was too close to the Iranian mainland to hold. To defend the island, the coastline needed to be controlled; to control the coastline, the Zagros Mountains needed to be penetrated. The task would expand endlessly like a snowball, just like the Vietnam War. No one intended to take this path, but once embarked on it, it was difficult to turn back.
Third, the theological framework of Shia Islam is a variable most easily underestimated by the West. In the Shia narrative, compromising with an unjust enemy is true defeat; resistance is necessary even at the cost of death. The US and Israel's choice to assassinate Khamenei and his family touched upon the deepest wounds of "betrayal" in Shia history. This will not force Iran to yield; it will only fuel the resistance of the entire Shia world, making them even more resolute and determined.
More problematic is that the US no longer has a genuine exit strategy. If it withdraws, Iran will demand astronomical sums—approximately $1 trillion in reparations—plus a demand for the US to permanently leave the Middle East. In that case, the Gulf states would collectively side with Iran, the petrodollar system would crumble, and confidence in US protection capabilities in Japan, South Korea, and Europe would collapse. If the war continues, the US's $39 trillion debt and its economic structure reliant on foreign purchases of dollars simply cannot sustain a protracted war of attrition.
To advance is to fall into a quagmire. To retreat is to suffer defeat.
Jiang Xueqin paints a bleak picture of the future: the war evolves into a protracted war of attrition similar to that in Ukraine; Saudi Arabia declares war on Iran, dragging Pakistan into the conflict; Iran pushes oil prices to $200 per barrel; severe damage to Qatar's LNG facilities leads to a permanent shutdown of 20% of global natural gas trade; and energy crises erupt first in East and Southeast Asia. Further in the long term, three structural trends are simultaneously returning: deindustrialization due to the end of cheap energy; remilitarization due to the collapse of "American-led peace"; and mercantilism due to the fragmentation of globalization.
On the American mainland, if Trump pushes for nationwide conscription, the political polarization between the left and right will send the National Guard into the cities, and the United States will head towards a state of long-term unrest similar to the "troublesome period" in Northern Ireland. It will not be a civil war, but it will not be much better.
There are no winners in this story, only losers of varying degrees.
The end times are coming, and they are waiting for the Messiah.
Many rationalists are reluctant to take this script seriously because it sounds too much like science fiction. But ignoring it is the truly unserious attitude.
Within Israel, there exists an eschatological fervor. Some rabbis and believers no longer view the war through the lens of security or geopolitics; instead, they see it as a catalyst for the "coming of the Messiah." Within this framework, the greater the pressure on Israel, the closer God's intervention seems.
The most thrilling part of this apocalyptic scenario is undoubtedly the operation against the Al-Aqsa Mosque complex in Jerusalem. The scenario predicts that Israel might exploit the extreme chaos of war, using years of underground "archaeological excavations" as cover to carry out a precise "controlled demolition," thus completely destroying the mosque. This destruction is intended to clear obstacles for the construction of the Jewish "Third Temple."
According to religious beliefs, the reconstruction of the Temple signifies the complete revival of the Jewish people and the beginning of the Messianic era. To deflect international pressure and religious anger, this action could be cleverly attributed to an accidental bombing by Iranian missiles or a stray bullet, thereby triggering an unprecedented all-out religious war between the Persians, Arabs, and Israel.
The "Greater Israel Plan" has emerged, based on ancient religious narratives, to expand its territory to a vast area from the Nile River in Egypt to the Euphrates River in Iraq, and even touches parts of southern Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
By completely dismantling the existing geopolitical structure, all scattered Jews can be forced to return to the land, and a new world order dominated by theocracy can be established.
Supporters of this narrative include the "Christian Support for Israel" organization, with approximately 7 million members in the United States, and a large evangelical community. These groups provide crucial funding and moral support for this agenda, genuinely believing that Israel is the key to Jesus' Second Coming. On a more covert level, Freemasonry, the Knights Templar, the Rosicrucians, and certain factions within Judaism are believed to be involved in shaping policy direction behind the scenes in various ways.
There are two interpretations of Trump's role in this script: he may have been misled by advisors like Kushner and Rubio, who have apocalyptic tendencies, and became an unwitting actor; or he may have developed a kind of "God's chosen people" illusion after experiencing impeachment, prosecution, shooting, and miraculous return to the White House.
The intervention of this mystical variable has transformed the Middle East war from a conflict that could be easily resolved through diplomatic negotiations into a self-reinforcing system that, once initiated, could drag the entire world into an abyss of reshaping the foundations of civilization and faith.
Al Jazeera recently published an article titled "US-Israeli Strategy Against Iran Is Taking Effect," written by a US State Department advisor. He argues that the US military action is systematically dismantling Iran's ability to project regional power. Critics focus only on the immediate casualties and economic costs, failing to see that threats accumulated over the past 40 years are being eliminated one by one.
Interestingly, Al Jazeera, which is generally considered to have a pro-Arab and pro-Islam stance, published this article, which in itself demonstrates that a considerable portion of the Middle East already believes that the United States will win this time.
What will the ending be? Five scenarios, five endings, some may come true individually, others may overlap.
Trump wants it to end quickly, but war may not fit into his schedule; Iran wants to buy its way out, but Saudi Arabia will not allow the war to end like this; the US military wants to control the strait, but no one has yet calculated the cost of the island war; Jiang Xueqin said the US will lose, but there are a hundred ways to lose; believers in the end times are waiting for the Messiah, but history never follows religious scripts.
The ship was moving, its engines roaring, and the deck was full of people, each pushing it in what they believed was the right direction.
But no one is at the helm.
