Why does Iran prefer stablecoins as the currency for passage through the Strait of Hormuz?

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Iran's Revolutionary Guard is expanding its cryptocurrency investment footprint: the Strait of Hormuz may impose passage fees for Bitcoin and stablecoins.

Written by: Chainalysis

Compiled by: AididiaoJP, Foresight News

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Bloomberg reported on April 1, 2026, that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had begun charging transit fees to ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The fees, negotiated between shipping operators and Iran, typically started at around one dollar per barrel of oil and could be paid in yuan or stablecoins through an intermediary and licensing system affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard. Subsequently, a Financial Times report, citing a spokesperson for the Iranian Oil, Gas and Petrochemical Exporters Association, stated that during the ceasefire, shipping companies wishing to pass through the Strait of Hormuz would be required to pay a transit fee of one dollar per barrel in cryptocurrency.

Although the statement specifically mentions Bitcoin, we speculate that Iran may prioritize stablecoins over Bitcoin when levying such fees, which is consistent with the long-standing pattern of the Iranian regime and its regional proxies relying heavily on stablecoins for illicit trade and sanctions evasion.

This latest development is an extension of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' expanding cryptocurrency footprint. According to sanctions designations from the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control, seizure lists from the U.S. National Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Center, and leaked data on addresses of the Central Bank of Iran, the Revolutionary Guard's cryptocurrency activities accounted for approximately half of the total size of Iran's cryptocurrency ecosystem in the fourth quarter of 2025, involving billions of dollars in transactions.

Shipping companies that pay passage fees to Iran through the Strait of Hormuz face significant sanctions exposure due to Iran's comprehensive sanctions imposed by the United States and the international community. This typically means that companies must obtain specific licenses or approvals from the relevant authorities before engaging in transactions with sanctioned entities or jurisdictions.

As the situation develops, regulatory agencies, law enforcement agencies, and stablecoin issuers all need to play a role in identifying wallets controlled by the Revolutionary Guard and their counterparties, and freezing illicit assets.

New Frontiers in National-Level Cryptocurrency Applications

Bloomberg reported on April 1, 2026, that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has begun charging transit fees to ships seeking safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Shipping operators are required to go through an intermediary affiliated with the IRGC, submitting detailed information about vessel ownership, flag, cargo, destination, and crew, and then negotiate fees—typically starting at about one dollar per barrel of oil, payable in yuan or stablecoins—in exchange for a license code and a route for escorted passage, a practice known in the industry as the "Iranian tollbooth."

Subsequently, a Financial Times report on April 8, 2026, quoted Hamid Hosseini, a spokesperson for the Iranian Oil, Gas and Petrochemical Exporters Association—an industry association working closely with the state—as saying that oil tankers would be required to notify Iranian authorities of their cargo status via email, after which Iran would inform them of the toll amount to be paid in "digital currency." He specifically mentioned Bitcoin, noting that the tankers would have "a few seconds to complete the payment in Bitcoin to ensure that it cannot be traced or confiscated due to sanctions."

If implemented, this measure would mark a significant milestone: the first known instance of a sovereign state demanding payment for international waterway transit fees in cryptocurrency. Beyond the immediate crisis, Tehran's move sets a dangerous precedent for future international business activities. If successful, this mechanism would provide a proof-of-concept that could be easily imitated by other severely sanctioned actors and replicated at other crucial maritime chokepoints and strategic arteries in global trade.

Although the concept may sound novel, it perfectly aligns with the Iranian regime's well-documented and rapidly expanding use of cryptocurrencies—especially stablecoins—to massively facilitate trade in weapons, oil, and commodities.

Why we expect stablecoins, rather than Bitcoin?

Hosseini's remarks explicitly mentioned Bitcoin, and this choice appears logical on the surface: Bitcoin is completely decentralized, and therefore, unlike stablecoins such as USDT, it cannot be frozen by the issuer. However, based on our in-depth analysis of the Iranian regime's on-chain behavior, we speculate that if this plan is implemented, stablecoins will ultimately become the preferred tool for large-scale toll collection.

Historically, the Iranian regime has utilized stablecoins because their peg to the US dollar guarantees their function as a store of value and provides the liquidity needed for large-scale applications. With the Iranian rial's plunge and the ongoing economic crisis, the regime's reliance on stablecoins has taken on even greater strategic significance. In contrast, Bitcoin experiences regular price fluctuations. Because Bitcoin has no issuer and cannot be seized or frozen by intermediaries, it is primarily used by Iranian cyber actors to collect ransomware payments and support malicious cyber operations. This is a completely different application scenario from the large-scale, commercially driven financial flows involved in the Strait of Hormuz passage fees.

According to existing records, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' on-chain activities—encompassing oil sales, weapons procurement, and agent funding—have overwhelmingly relied on stablecoins as a medium of exchange. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world's most critical chokepoints, traversing approximately 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas transport. Given that tankers in the Persian Gulf currently carry approximately 175 million barrels of crude oil and refined petroleum products, even levying tolls on just a portion of these oil shipments could provide the Islamic Republic with much-needed revenue during one of the most severe threats it has faced in decades.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard's Crypto Empire: Billions of Dollars on the Blockchain

To understand why a cryptocurrency-denominated toll for passage through the Strait of Hormuz would be a logical next step for the Iranian regime, it is essential to understand the scale and sophistication of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' existing on-chain operations.

As we documented in our analysis of Iran's $7.8 billion crypto ecosystem earlier this year, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' on-chain activity has been steadily growing, reaching approximately half of the total size of Iran's crypto ecosystem by Q4 2025. Funds received by addresses associated with the Revolutionary Guard exceeded $2 billion in 2024 and surged to over $3 billion by 2025. These figures are conservative estimates, as they only cover addresses identified through sanctions designations by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control and the U.S. National Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Center's seizure lists, and do not represent all shell companies, financial intermediaries, and other wallets controlled by the Revolutionary Guard.

Impact of sanctions on shipping companies

For the global shipping industry, Iran's cryptocurrency toll poses significant compliance risks. Iran is subject to comprehensive US sanctions, meaning that US individuals and entities are prohibited from engaging in virtually any transaction involving the Iranian government, its institutions, and its instruments. Shipping companies seeking to transit the Strait of Hormuz could face severe penalties if they make payments to Iran in cryptocurrency or any other form. Furthermore, given the fragile ceasefire, not all oil companies, shipping companies, and other multinational corporations may be prepared to transport and insure cargo in the strait.

Typically, companies need to apply for specific licenses or approvals from the U.S. Treasury Department to transact with sanctioned entities or conduct trade activities in sanctioned jurisdictions. Making cryptocurrency payments to entities linked to the Iranian state without such authorization is likely to constitute a sanctions violation, exposing the company to enforcement action, fines, and reputational damage, as it could provide material support for Iran's war operations and its proxy groups throughout the region.

The fact that these payments are denominated in cryptocurrency rather than traditional fiat currency does not alter the impact of the sanctions behind them. However, unlike traditional payment channels, the inherent transparency of blockchain allows regulators and compliance teams to track fund flows in near real-time. This helps identify entities that have direct or indirect interactions with sanctioned wallets.

Looking ahead: Opportunities for implementing circuit breakers

Continuously identifying and verifying the wallet addresses of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains crucial. Each addition to the sanctions designation and seizure list further enriches the on-chain graph of the Revolutionary Guard's financial infrastructure, making it increasingly difficult for the regime to access mainstream liquidity.

Opportunities for implementing containment measures span the public and private sectors:

  • Stablecoin issuers can technically freeze assets in wallets identified as being controlled or associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or other sanctioned entities. If, as we expect, the Iranian regime does indeed use stablecoins to collect tolls in the Strait of Hormuz, this would constitute a direct intervention node.
  • Law enforcement agencies can use blockchain intelligence to trace the flow of toll payments through the Revolutionary Guard's money laundering infrastructure, potentially identifying new nodes in the network and exit points for fund withdrawals.
  • Regulators should continue to publicly identify and verify the wallet addresses of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, expanding the known boundaries of activities on the Iranian regime's blockchain.
  • Compliance teams at exchanges, financial institutions, and shipping companies should continuously monitor exposure to wallets linked to Iranian services and the Revolutionary Guard, especially given that this new fee structure could introduce new types of fund flows into the mainstream crypto ecosystem.

As Iran continues to integrate cryptocurrencies into its national fiscal operations—from oil sales and agent financing to maritime transit fees—blockchain analytics is crucial for maintaining visibility into these financial flows and for empowering the international community to mitigate risks and generate actionable leads.

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Disclaimer: The content above is only the author's opinion which does not represent any position of Followin, and is not intended as, and shall not be understood or construed as, investment advice from Followin.
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