Liquidity Wars 3.0: Bribery Becomes a Market

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If you can determine the direction of liquidity, you can influence who will survive in the next market cycle.

Author: arndxt, Crypto KOL

Translated by: Felix, PANews

The yield war may be staged again. If you have been in the DeFi field long enough, you will understand that Total Value Locked (TVL) is just a vanity metric. Because in the modular world of competitive AMMs, perpetual contracts, and lending protocols, what truly matters is who can control the flow of liquidity, not who owns the protocol, or even who offers the most rewards. It's about who can persuade liquidity providers (LPs) to deposit funds and ensure TVL stability. This is the origin of the bribery economy.

What was once an informal vote-buying behavior (Curve wars, Convex, etc.) has now been professionalized into a mature liquidity coordination market, equipped with order books, dashboards, incentive routing layers, and even gamified participation mechanisms in some cases.

This is now becoming the most strategically significant layer in the entire DeFi stack.

Change: From Issuance to Meta-Incentives

During 2021 to 2022, protocols guided liquidity in a traditional way:

  • Deploy a fund pool

  • Issue tokens

  • Hope that profit-driven LPs would stay even after yield declines

But this model has a fundamental flaw: it is passive. Each new protocol is competing with an invisible cost: the opportunity cost of existing capital flow.

I. The Origin of Yield Wars: Curve and the Rise of Voting Markets

The concept of yield wars began with the Curve war in 2021 and gradually took shape.

Curve Finance's Unique Design

Curve introduced vote-escrowed (ve) token economics, where users can lock CRV (Curve's native token) for up to 4 years in exchange for veCRV, which gives users the following advantages:

  • Enhance Curve pool rewards

  • Governance rights with voting weight (which pools receive rewards)

This created a meta-game around yields:

Protocols want to obtain liquidity on Curve

The only way to obtain liquidity is to attract votes to their pools

So they began bribing veCRV holders to vote in support

Thus, Convex Finance was born (a platform focused on improving Curve protocol yields):

Lesson 1: Whoever controls voting weight controls liquidity.

II. Meta-Incentives and Bribery Markets

First Bribery Economy

Initially just manual operations to influence issuance, it gradually evolved into a mature market where:

  • Votium became an off-chain bribery platform for CRV issuance.

  • The emergence of Redacted Cartel, Warden, and Hidden Hand extended this model to other protocols like Balancer and Frax.

  • Protocols no longer just pay issuance fees but strategically allocate incentives to optimize capital efficiency.

Expansion Beyond Curve

  • Balancer adopted the vote-escrowed mechanism through veBAL

  • Frax, Tokemak, and other protocols integrated similar systems

  • Incentive routing platforms like Aura Finance and Llama Airforce further added complexity, turning issuance into a capital coordination game

Lesson 2: Yields are no longer about Annual Percentage Yield (APY), but about programmable meta-incentives.

III. How Yield Wars Unfold

Here's how protocols compete in this game:

  • Liquidity aggregation: Aggregating influence through wrappers like Convex (e.g., Aura Finance for Balancer)

  • Bribery activities: Reserving budgets for ongoing voting bribery to attract issuance when needed

  • Game theory and token economics: Locking tokens to establish long-term alignment (e.g., ve model)

  • Community incentives: Gamifying voting through Non-Fungible Tokens, lotteries, or reward airdrops

Today, protocols like Turtle Club and Royco are guiding liquidity: no longer blindly issuing, but auctioning incentive mechanisms to LPs based on demand signals.

Essentially: "You bring liquidity, we'll guide incentive mechanisms where they're most needed."

This releases a second-order effect: Protocols no longer need to forcibly acquire liquidity but coordinate it.

Turtle Club

Turtle Club has quietly become one of the most effective bribery markets, yet rarely mentioned. Their pools are typically embedded with partnerships, with a Total Value Locked (TVL) over $580 million, using dual-token issuance, weighted bribes, and surprisingly sticky LP base.

Their model emphasizes fair value redistribution, meaning yield distribution is determined by voting and real-time capital turnover rate.

This is a smarter flywheel: LPs' rewards are related to their capital efficiency, not just capital size. This time, efficiency is incentivized.

Royco

Royco's monthly Total Value Locked (TVL) surged over $2.6 billion, a 267,000% quarter-on-quarter increase.

While some funds are "points-driven", the important thing is the underlying infrastructure:

  • Royco is an order book for liquidity preference.

  • Protocols can't just issue rewards and hope for capital inflow. They post requests, and LPs decide to invest, forming a market through this coordination.

Here's why this narrative is more than just a yield game:

  • These markets are becoming the meta-governance layer of DeFi.

  • Hidden Hand has accumulated over $35 million in bribes between major protocols like Velodrome and Balancer.

  • Royco and Turtle Club are shaping effective issuance schemes.

Mechanisms of Liquidity Coordination Markets

1. Bribes as Market Signals

Projects like Turtle Club allow LPs to understand the direction of incentives, make decisions based on real-time indicators, and receive rewards based on capital efficiency rather than just capital size.

2. Liquidity Requests (RfL) as Order Books

Projects like Royco allow protocols to list liquidity needs, like placing orders in a market, with LPs executing these orders based on expected returns.

This becomes a two-way coordination game, not a one-sided bribery.

If you can determine the direction of liquidity, you can influence who will survive in the next market cycle.

Source
Disclaimer: The content above is only the author's opinion which does not represent any position of Followin, and is not intended as, and shall not be understood or construed as, investment advice from Followin.
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