A few days ago, a Curve grant proposal to allocate 17 million USD to the development team (Swiss Stake AG) for development funding was rejected. Convex and Yearn both voted against it, and their voting power was significant enough to influence the final outcome. Since the Aave governance issues began to surface, governance has started to receive market attention, and the inertia of simply providing funding has begun to break down. There are two key points behind Curve's proposal: 1. A segment of the community doesn't oppose allocating funds to the AG, but they want to know how the money has been used in the past, how it will be used in the future, its sustainability, and whether it has brought benefits to the project. At the same time, this overly primitive grant model means that once the money is disbursed, there are no constraints. In the future, the DAO needs to establish a Treasury, and income and expenditure need to be transparent, or governance constraints need to be increased. 2. The major voting members of veCRV don't want to dilute their value. This is a clear conflict of interest. If the projects supported by CRV grants cannot foreseeably generate benefits for veCRV, they are unlikely to receive support. Of course, Convex and Yearn also have their own self-interests and power dynamics, but we won't discuss those here. This proposal was initiated by Curve founder Mich, and AG is one of the teams that has been maintaining the core codebase since 2020. The roadmap provided by AG for this funding allocation roughly includes continuing to advance llamalend, including support for PT and LP, as well as the expansion of the on-chain forex market and crvUSD. It seems worthwhile, but whether it deserves the 17M $CRV allocation needs further calculation, especially since Curve's governance differs significantly from Aave's. Its power is distributed among several teams with distinct stances. Comparing Curve with conventional governance models: In conclusion, most conventional governance models currently have virtually no advantages in their design. Of course, if the DAO is mature enough, the traditional structure can function well, but unfortunately, no Crypto project has yet reached that level of maturity. Even Aave, a leader in market consensus, has encountered problems. If we only discuss the model design, Vetoken (VE) has certain advantages. Firstly, it has a cash flow mechanism, backed by liquidity control. When external liquidity demands arise, this control can be manipulated. Therefore, even if you don't want to lock up your tokens long-term, you can delegate them to proxy projects like Convex/Yearn to earn rewards. So, Vetoken uses a model that links voting rights to cash flow. Its future evolution will likely follow a "governance capitalism" path. Vetoken binds voting rights to "long-term lock-up," essentially filtering out those with large capital, the ability to withstand liquidity losses, and the capacity for long-term strategic maneuvering. Over time, the governance will gradually shift from ordinary users to a "capital group." Furthermore, due to the existence of proxy layers like Convex/Yearn, many ordinary users, even loyal users, who want to gain rewards without sacrificing liquidity and flexibility, will gradually choose to delegate their tokens to these projects for governance. This vote also reveals some clues: in the future, governance of Curve may not be primarily driven by the Mich, but rather by those with large voting rights. When Aave encountered governance problems, some proposed the idea of "delegated governance/elite governance," which is actually quite similar to Curve's current structure. Whether this is good or bad remains to be seen.