If you really want to discuss the issue, then let's discuss it. It's okay if I'm wrong. However, brother, what you said is full of loopholes: 1. "Address and public key are two different things"—that's true, but this is actually the root of the exposure risk. P2PK (Pay-to-Public-Key): Early addresses directly wrote the public key in the scriptPubKey, 100% exposed from the genesis block (no spending required). These are not "hash addresses," but raw public key addresses. 2PKH/P2WPKH, etc.: The address is a public key hash; the public key is hidden when not spent. But once spent, the public key is exposed on the chain during signing. After that, this UTXO becomes permanently quantum fragile. "The ancient gurus have already converted to hashes" sounds like "it's okay," but it ignores two types of real exposure: 1) P2PKs that haven't been converted yet (still accounting for the majority of early mining output). 2) Converted but reused addresses (exposed after spending)—this is the mainstream risk. 1. The idea that "address = hash equals security" is a panacea, ignoring the reality of exposure after spending. 2. "At most, the exposed public keys don't amount to many block rewards"—this needs to be estimated based on data. It can't be based on mere assumptions. On March 31, 2026, the Google Quantum AI white paper explicitly estimated that: Early P2PK (Pay-to-Public-Key) addresses directly exposed public keys, locking over 1.7 million BTC. Considering all script types and address reuse, approximately 6.9 million BTC are in a quantum exposed state (about 32% of the total supply), with reused addresses accounting for the majority of the exposure. Even using the white paper's most conservative estimate of 2.3 million (dormant), it's not a small number, not to mention that address reuse further expands the exposure. This data is not just "not many block rewards"!