The US-demanded 15-point ceasefire agreement has been revealed, prompting Iran to denounce it as "unacceptable." Reuters reports that the new agreement could be signed as early as the 6th.

Witkoff 's 15-point framework, described by Iranian officials to Reuters, "demands that Iran relinquish its self-defense capabilities in exchange for vague commitments to lift sanctions." If this characterization is accurate, the negotiations have had no common ground from the outset—one side demands disarmament, while the other's bottom line is a "complete end" of the war, not a "ceasefire." The gap between these two demands cannot be bridged by mediation.

What exactly does the 15-point framework want? A list that Iran is unlikely to sign.

The Trump administration has not officially released the full 15-point statement, but according to Israeli Channel 12, citing Western sources and White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt, the leaked version is "partially true." The core demands are as follows:

The plan includes the complete dismantling of nuclear facilities —the dismantling of the Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow nuclear facilities; a halt to all uranium enrichment activities within Iran; the transfer of enriched nuclear materials to the IAEA; and a permanent commitment not to develop nuclear weapons. In exchange, the US offered to assist Iran in developing civilian nuclear power in Bushehr.

Military capability reductions include cutting ballistic missile stockpiles and range limits; halting funding for and abandoning proxy networks, including Hezbollah and the Houthis; and ceasing attacks on regional energy facilities.

Strait of Hormuz – Reopen the shipping lanes immediately, with a 30-day ceasefire to be implemented before finalizing details.

The US made concessions —fully lifting sanctions against Iran; canceling the UN Security Council's "snapback" sanctions mechanism.

Iran's reaction is not hard to understand: this list is tantamount to demanding that Tehran relinquish its nuclear capabilities, delivery capabilities, and proxy networks—in other words, all the strategic deterrent assets Iran has built up over the past 40 years. The US concessions, however, are limited to the lifting of sanctions and do not involve the withdrawal of US military bases or war reparations. Iran's diplomatic system can be summarized as "maximalist and unreasonable."

Over the past 10 days, the US and Iran have held indirect negotiations through three channels—Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey—with no substantial progress. Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif has communicated with both sides, but can likely only relay messages.

Inflation problem at the deadline

Trump's record on deadlines is worth reviewing: a 48-hour ultimatum was set on March 26, which was then extended; a new deadline was set on April 6, and then pushed back to April 7 on the same day. Polymarket currently predicts a 99% probability that Trump will take military action against Iran in 2026, but only about a 35% probability that the US will reach a ceasefire with Iran before the end of April.

Putting these two figures together, the market's logic is quite clear: military action is almost certain, but the probability of a ceasefire is far lower than the probability of armed conflict. In other words, the market has already incorporated a prolonged conflict into its baseline scenario, rather than viewing the war as a short-lived episode that will end quickly.

Oil prices and market pricing logic

Oil prices have now broken through $100 per barrel, up about 40-45% since the start of the conflict. Although OPEC+ agreed to increase production, several key member countries are themselves in conflict zones or affected by the conflict, and the market is recalculating the gap between the production increase commitments and actual shipments.

The S&P 500 fell 1.7%, a relatively mild figure compared to the rise in oil prices. This can be partly interpreted as the strength of the energy sector offsetting pressure from other sectors, but a more likely reason is that the market has not yet fully priced in a complete blockade of the Strait of Hormuz – current pricing is still based on the assumption of "disruption but not complete disruption."

Casualty figures and escalation trajectory

To date, US-Israeli airstrikes have killed at least 34 people in Iran, including six children. Iran's retaliatory actions are also escalating: missiles struck a residential building in Haifa, killing at least two and injuring four; attacks also targeted Kuwaiti power and freshwater facilities and Bahrain's oil facilities.

Iran characterized the Witkoff framework as "inciting war crimes," a term not of diplomatic jargon but a discourse frame designed for a domestic audience—a politically improbable outcome for Iran after the deaths of 34 civilians.

"Islamabad Agreement": The same multiple-choice question in a different package

Amid the stalemate, Reuters, citing sources, reported on the 6th that Pakistan has drafted a framework proposal tentatively called the "Islamabad Accord" and submitted it to both the US and Iran. The proposal is divided into two phases: the first phase involves an immediate ceasefire and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz; the second phase aims to reach a final agreement within 15 to 20 days—including a commitment from Iran not to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and the unfreezing of its assets.

According to reports, Pakistani Army Chief of Staff Asim Munir maintained contact throughout the night with US Vice President Vance, Special Envoy Witkoff, and Iranian Foreign Minister Araqchi. However, Iran has only stated that it is "reviewing" the matter and reiterated that it "will not accept deadlines or pressure."

It's worth noting that the substantive content of this framework highly overlaps with Witkoff's 15-point proposal—both demand that Iran open the Straits first, followed by negotiations. The difference lies in the fact that this time Pakistan is backing the deal, rather than the US exerting unilateral pressure. This gives Iran more face, allowing it to interpret the situation as "accepting mediation" rather than "yielding to threats." This may be the stepping stone both sides are looking for.

The problem of steps

The chances of negotiations breaking down are currently higher than those of success. However, a breakdown does not equate to an immediate all-out war; both sides are searching for a way to claim they have not lost. Iran's condition is a "complete end to the entire war," while Trump's condition is the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz—neither of which can be fulfilled in the short term.

The April 7th deadline will most likely be extended again in some form, or replaced by limited military action instead of a full-scale air campaign. The former would keep the deadline inflated, while the latter would escalate the situation further. Neither outcome is a solution; they merely postpone the problem to the next deadline.