🎄A terrifying Christmas Eve! A summary of Trust Wallet attacks
He who controls the spice controls the universe
Whoever controls spices controls the universe.
This is a quote from the movie Dune, left on the page of metrics-trustwallet[.]com, a domain involved in the latest attack on Trust Wallet.
It may seem like a hacker's sarcastic remark, but it's also a harsh reminder: seed phrase are like spices in a movie; once they're controlled, they mean absolute control of the asset.
For many Trust Wallet users, this Christmas Eve was destined to be anything but peaceful. What should have been a joyous holiday time for families turned into a devastating blow when their wallets were emptied.
How did this happen? As ordinary users, are we really left with no choice but to surrender?
🔹Event Recap: A Meticulously Planned Robbery
Around December 24th, the Trust Wallet browser extension released version 2.68.
With browser extensions automatically updating, many users completed the upgrade process without taking any active action. What was originally intended to improve security has instead become a channel for malicious code to enter users' devices.
There were no pop-up warnings or abnormal behavior alerts; everything seemed normal.
On the morning of December 25, the nightmare began when people woke up and checked their wallets.
More and more users are issuing warnings on social media and in communities: their wallet assets are being transferred out without warning, and assets on multiple chains such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Solana are being affected simultaneously.
On December 26, Trust Wallet officially announced that browser extension version 2.68 has security risks and urgently advised users to immediately disable this version and upgrade to version 2.69.
But for many users, it was too late. According to community and on-chain statistics, more than $6 million in crypto assets have been stolen in this incident.
🔹Attack Method: Poison Hidden in Updates Security researchers discovered something fishy in a JavaScript file named 4482.js in version 2.6.8. This malicious code disguised itself as a common "data analysis" or "performance monitoring" function.
Various triggering conditions:
It not only triggers when a user imports seed phrase, but it also steals and sends the stored seed phrase to the target domain when the user only enters a password to unlock the extension.
metrics-trustwallet[.]com looks very much like an official data statistics or monitoring domain. Once a user enters seed phrase in version 2.68, or simply unlocks their wallet with a password, this code silently captures the seed phrase data and sends it to the hacker's server. The user is completely unaware until their assets are wiped out.
There is currently controversy in the community regarding how malicious code got into the official update:
Was the external supply chain contaminated? Or was it injected directly by internal personnel? Or were the development accounts hacked? Trust Wallet has not yet released detailed investigation results.
But regardless of the truth, the result is the same: the update released through official channels contained malicious code, and users were caught completely off guard.
🔹The Dilemma of Using Hot Wallets: This incident still reflects the fundamental problems of software wallets:
Seed phrase are stored on connected devices, and once the software is compromised, the assets are left unprotected.
Trust Wallet users haven't done anything wrong. They use well-known wallets, download them from the official store, and receive official updates, yet they are still being hacked. So where did the problem lie?
For hot wallets, the seed phrase must be stored in the device's memory or in an encrypted file to sign transactions. As long as the seed phrase needs to be "decrypted-used-encrypted" at the software level, there is a risk of it being intercepted by malicious code.
Browser extensions contain tens of thousands of lines of code, depend on dozens of third-party libraries, and update automatically without a buffer period. A problem in any of these components could become an entry point for attacks.
When the software itself becomes a target for attacks, hot wallets that rely on software to protect seed phrase are like building a castle on quicksand.
🔹The security mechanism of a cold wallet: Hardware cold wallets like Keystone offer a simple solution:
Physical isolation, never touching the internet.
Once the seed phrase is generated internally by Keystone, it will never appear in an online environment. Even if your computer is hacked or your browser extensions are compromised, threats cannot overcome physical isolation.
When sending a transaction: the computer generates transaction data → transmits it to Keystone via QR code → the device completes the signature → the signature result is sent back → broadcast to the blockchain.
Throughout the entire process, the seed phrase and private key never leave the device; only the "transaction data" and "signature result" are transmitted.
Even if a user installs a wallet plugin with malicious code for various reasons, the seed phrase remains secure when using a Keystone connection and will not be sent to an external server because it never exists in the hot wallet environment.
This is the core value of cold wallets: completely removing seed phrase from the attack surface and replacing software protection with physical isolation.
Instead of worrying about every hot wallet update, why not update your security plan and place seed phrase in a more secure environment, allowing you to enjoy every holiday with your family with peace of mind? 🎄
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