Augur was one of the earliest prediction markets in the crypto space two cycles ago, and Joey is its co-founder. In this respect, he should be one of the people most deeply aware of the changes in prediction markets. Let's see how he views these changes: In a recent interview, he shared his experiences with the successes and failures of prediction markets: He believes that Augur faced three major problems in its early stages: low liquidity, poor user experience, and regulatory uncertainty. Ultimately, this led to a mismatch between the product and the market. He also believes that Augur demonstrated the potential of crypto-native innovation, but it also exposed the gap between concept and practical application: 10 years ago, the focus was on "innovation theater," but now it needs to focus on real needs. He believes the lessons to be learned are that prediction markets need to solve the "oracle problem" (real-world data input) and user barriers, rather than relying solely on the concept of decentralization; furthermore, founders should avoid "premature decentralization," building a centralized prototype market first to test it before going live on-chain. Joey believes that the main reason for Polyamarket's breakthrough is its real-time event predictions (such as elections and sports) and high-liquidity design, which have attracted non-crypto users. For example, it aggregates information more accurately than traditional polls, and the surge in trading volume during the 2024 US election proves its value as an "information market." Regarding whether prediction markets are merely gambling, his view is that they are no longer just niche gambling, but rather risk hedging tools. For example, businesses can use them for supply chain forecasting, transcending the stereotype of "just gambling." This marks a shift in crypto from speculation to practicality. Similar to the stock market, prediction markets involve speculation, but at their core is information discovery. Joey believes that if regulators view them as pure gambling, they will miss out on economic benefits. In the future, the US may require prediction markets to comply with KYC/AML, restricting anonymous transactions; the EU and Asian policies are more favorable, but the US dominates global standards. Regulation is a double-edged sword; on the one hand, clarity will attract institutions, but excessive regulation (such as banning betting on certain types of events) will stifle innovation. He suggests that prediction market projects proactively cooperate with regulators to avoid an "adversarial model."