A research paper compiled by graduate students from National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica analyzed 23 criminal cases related to renewable energy, based on publicly available data from the Ministry of Justice. The paper summarizes the criminal incidents in Taiwan's renewable energy sector and points out that the "green energy cockroaches" referred to by the media and prosecutors do not refer solely to energy companies, but rather to a structured criminal network comprised of low-level civil servants, gangsters, and a few speculators. The paper also summarizes how to reform the substandard green energy environment and reduce the damage caused by "green energy cockroaches" to Taiwan's energy development.
"Green Electricity Cockroaches" reproduce in large numbers by relying on green and clean energy.
Renewable energy infrastructure has advantages such as low carbon emissions, renewability, and long-term cost, and is regarded as a key infrastructure for the world to move towards zero emissions. However, high demand has also unexpectedly created new crime spaces. From the perspective of "green criminology" in the paper, when green and clean energy policies are combined with large amounts of funds, land, and administrative power, crimes such as fraud, official corruption and bribery, and gang intimidation will proliferate. The huge profits become the nourishment for green energy cockroaches, making them very wealthy. Taiwan's green energy infrastructure is seriously lagging behind, affecting the rights and interests of all Taiwanese people.
The three major criminal methods of green electric cockroaches
The "green energy cockroaches" operate under three main criminal models. The first is "investment fraud," often perpetrated by companies posing as renewable energy startups that spread false information to lure investors or obtain subsidies. These cases are typically prosecuted as financial or commercial crimes. The second is "corruption cases," including embezzlement by public officials and bribery involving collusion between government and business. Notably, those involved are mostly "lower-level civil servants," and the crimes are highly concentrated at the "township level," indicating that corruption originates at the grassroots level, not at the higher levels. The third is gang intimidation, involving blocking roads and land to extort protection money and using violence to rob victims.
Energy developers are not the perpetrators, but rather the targets of extortion by organized crime and local interests.
The study overturns the common perception that "energy developers are the perpetrators." In most cases, energy companies are actually the targets of extortion by local factions, government officials, or organized crime, forced to pay kickbacks, donations, or transfer benefits through intermediaries in exchange for easier access to land, administrative reviews, or grid connection. This reflects how weak local governance, factional politics, and organized crime intertwine to create a breeding ground for "green electricity cockroaches."
From a structural perspective, the study identifies two key institutional incentives. The first is "land allocation and use regulation." Renewable energy requires large amounts of fragmented land, particularly in rural or sparsely populated areas, giving local governments and grassroots officials significant power and creating opportunities for extortion. The second is the "feed-in tariff" (FIT) system. While stable and subsidized prices can stimulate investment, they also transform development permits into monetizable "concessions," attracting numerous green energy companies to compete for resources.
These environmental crimes not only cause financial losses, but more seriously, they erode public trust, intensify public resentment towards renewable energy, and even become tools for political parties to attack the failure of energy transition policies. This further exacerbates the antagonism between Taiwan's ruling party, opposition parties, and the public. This chaos of "using green energy as a pretext for corruption and fraud" weakens the legitimacy of green energy construction policies, chills the hearts of legitimate energy developers, and makes it impossible for Taiwan to continue developing sustainable green energy.
How to kill the green electric cockroach?
How can we eliminate the "green energy cockroaches"? The research report suggests making all green energy information available online, reclaiming local control, centralizing management, establishing an online system, and making all funding transparent and open to public scrutiny. Green and clean energy itself has good intentions; the problem lies in loopholes in the system and governance. Only by strengthening the legal framework and building a transparent and fair competition mechanism can we prevent the continued proliferation of "green energy cockroaches" that erode Taiwan's energy development.
This article, titled "Why are Taiwan's 'Green Electricity Cockroaches' So Indestructible, Turning into a Fraud and Intimidation Crime Chain?", first appeared on ABMedia .
